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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last five years, there has been a well-documented increase in 
the number of asylum seekers coming from the Northern Triangle of Central 
America,1 many of whom are fleeing horrific human rights abuses including 
gang and intrafamilial violence.2 Their claims have met with limited success. 
Under U.S. law, applicants for asylum must demonstrate that, upon return to 
their home countries, they would experience harms rising to the level of 
persecution on account of a protected ground: race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion, or membership in a particular social group. 
This last category has evolved to offer the most promise for asylum 
claims that do not satisfy any of the other four bases of eligibility. As such, 
“membership in a particular social group” has become a battleground 
between those who would like to see asylum protection in the U.S. expanded 
and those more inclined to limit its reach. A follower of the latter camp, 
Attorney General Sessions issued Matter of A-B- in June 2018, rejecting the 
claim of an asylum seeker who argued that she had been harmed as a member 
 
1 Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.  
2 See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, ADJUDICATION STATISTICS, https://www. 
justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1106366/download [https://perma.cc/W6DE-RWT2] (last updated 
Jan. 23, 2020) (reflecting that 47,581 asylum applications were filed in fiscal year 2014, 
63,701 in fiscal year 2015, 82,657 in fiscal year 2016, 144,983 in fiscal year 2017, 163,936 
in fiscal year 2018, and 211,794 in fiscal year 2019). Between 2013 and 2015, the United 
States received more affirmative asylum applications from the Northern Triangle “than in 
the 15 years prior combined.” Maureen Meyer & Elyssa Pachico, Fact Sheet: U.S. 
Immigration and Central American Asylum Seekers, WASH. OFF. ON LATIN AM. (Feb. 1, 
2018),  http://www.wola.org/analysis/fact-sheet-united-states-immigration-central-american 
-asylum-seekers/ [https://perma.cc/7A8W-C9L4].   
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of a particular social group defined by gender, nationality, and relationship 
status.3 In addition to vacating the order from the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“the Board” or “BIA”) to grant asylum to Ms. A-B-, Sessions also 
overruled Matter of A-R-C-G-, a groundbreaking 2014 decision that 
recognized that domestic violence can be the basis for an asylum claim.4 In 
doing so, Sessions opined that “[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to 
domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors5 
will not qualify for asylum.”6 
Despite this broad statement, a central tenet of asylum law is that each 
case must be analyzed on its individual record and there can be no blanket 
ruling for or against a certain particular social group or category of cases.7 
However, the practical effect of decisions issued unilaterally by Attorneys 
General cannot be underestimated. Following Matter of A-B-, attorneys 
around the country reported heightened scrutiny and a higher rate of denial 
of cases involving gender-based violence and gang violence.8 It is clear that 
 
3 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 317-21 (Att’y Gen. 2018). 
4 Id. at 319. 
5 An applicant for asylum must show either that the persecution is by the government or by 
a private actor that the government is unwilling or unable to control. See 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(B)(1) (2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)) (emphasis added) (linking the eligibility 
for asylum to the refugee definition, which only requires that the applicant be “unable or 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of” his or her country rather than have 
been persecuted by that country); see, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-83 (1992) 
(addressing a claim of persecution at the hands of non-governmental guerillas). 
6 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320. The District Court Judge in Grace v. Whitaker found 
that this constituted an impermissible blanket rule for claims involving domestic violence or gang 
violence. 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 126 (D.D.C. 2018). Although this case specifically challenged the 
application of Matter of A-B- and the corresponding U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services 
policy memorandum in the context of credible fear determinations, many of the judge’s 
conclusions are equally applicable to asylum and withholding of removal. 
7 See, e.g., Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 242 (B.I.A. 2014) (“[A] social group 
determination must be must be made on a case-by-case basis, because it is possible that under 
certain circumstances, the society would make such a distinction and consider [a] shared past 
experience to be a basis for distinction within that society.”). 
8 See Kennji Kizuka, Central Americans Were Increasingly Winning Asylum Before 
President Trump Took Office, HUM. RIGHTS FIRST (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.human 
rightsfirst.org/resource/central-americans-were-increasingly-winning-asylum-president-
trump-took-office [https://perma.cc/LC4W-STJB] (connecting the drop in asylum grants for 
Central Americans with the decision in Matter of A-B-); see also Dree Collopy, Matter of A-
B-: Case Updates, Current Trends, and Suggested Strategies, AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS ASS’N 
(Jan. 31, 2019), https://thinkimmigration.org/blog/2019/01/31/matter-of-a-b-case-updates-
current-trends-and-suggested-strategies/ [https://perma.cc/6UQX-UTS3] (noting that, after 
Matter of A-B, “[p]ractitioners across the country have noticed the application of heightened 
legal and evidentiary standards, and even the systematic and categorical denial of asylum 
claims involving domestic and gang violence”).  
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Matter of A-B- has given adjudicators who were already predisposed to deny 
asylum substantially more ground to stand on. 
The Trump Administration has propagated the message that we are 
facing a crisis at the border to justify increasingly draconian immigration 
policies.9 What this messaging ignores, however, is that this is a crisis of our 
own making, borne in large part from these very policies. Not to discount the 
very real human rights violations that immigrants are fleeing in their home 
countries, the situation has been dramatically exacerbated by the 
Administration’s choices, for example to restrict access to the border, to 
separate families, and to ramp up detention in conditions that have been 
likened to concentration camps.10 The attack on the legal framework for 
asylum has received less attention but is in many ways more insidious. 
There is an incredible amount of discretion involved in asylum 
adjudication, as demonstrated by the fact that the single most important 
variable in the success of an asylum application is the forum in which it is 
heard. In 2018, the San Francisco Immigration Court granted almost 70% of 
asylum cases whereas the Atlanta Court’s grant rate was 3.2%.11 A decision 
 
9 See SARAH PIERCE, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRATION-RELATED POLICY CHANGES IN 
THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 1 (2019), https://www.migrationpol 
icy.org/research/immigration-policy-changes-two-years-trump-administration [https://per 
ma.cc/J9KD-MUJH] (“After framing immigration as a threat to U.S. economic security and 
public safety during his campaign, upon taking office Trump immediately turned his 
administration’s focus to immigration enforcement by signing two executive orders . . . .”). 
10 See, e.g., Julia Love, Asylum Seekers Anxiously Cross into U.S. As New Policy Kicks in, 
REUTERS (July 17, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-mexico-
border/asylum-seekers-anxiously-cross-into-us-as-new-policy-kicks-in-idUSKCN1UC2VH 
[https://perma.cc/6YSE-EGYC] (“[New U.S. policy] requires asylum-seekers crossing a 
third country on the way to the United States to first pursue safe-haven there, precluding 
claims for the thousands who traverse Central American countries and Mexico to reach the 
U.S. border.”); U.S.: Family Separation Harming Children, Families, HUM. RIGHTS FIRST 
(July 11, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/11/us-family-separation-harming-chil 
dren-families [https://perma.cc/AZF4-6J8D] (“United States officials are separating migrant 
children from their families at the border . . . .”); Charles M. Blow, Trump’s ‘Concentration 
Camps,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/23/opinion/trump-
migrants-camps.html [https://perma.cc/XX7T-3FFF] (explaining that migrant children have 
been separated from their parents and are being held in conditions more akin to concentration 
camps than summer camp). 
11 See Asylum Decisions in San Francisco in 2018, TRAC IMMIGRATION: ASYLUM 
DECISIONS, https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/asylum/ [https://perma.cc/US9Z-LHT 
N] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (set “Immigration Court” filter to San Francisco, “Fiscal Year 
of Decision” filter to 2018, and select “Decision” filter) (showing that the San Francisco 
immigration court granted 1,620 applications out of 2,392, or 68%); see also Asylum 
Decisions in Atlanta in 2018, TRAC IMMIGRATION: ASYLUM DECISIONS, https:// trac.syr.edu 
/phptools/immigration/asylum/ [https://perma.cc/US9Z-LHTN] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) 
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like Matter of A-B- that did not actually change the law, but was teeming with 
restrictionist dicta, clearly emboldens less-refugee-friendly judges and 
suggests to migrants that it may be safer to enter the country without 
inspection than try their luck at “refugee roulette.”12 
In 2018, the Board issued a precedential decision requiring asylum 
applicants to clearly delineate in Immigration Court to which particular social 
group they are claiming membership in order to preserve them on appeal.13 It is 
now that much more critical in all cases, but especially those involving domestic 
or gang violence, for applicants not to overlook any workable legal theories. 
One promising line of argumentation is family-based particular social group 
membership. There is ample jurisprudence accepting the family as a cognizable 
social group and indicating that there is nexus to a protected ground when the 
persecutor was motivated by the applicant’s relationship to a family member.14  
In May 2018, the Board published Matter of L-E-A-, its first and only 
precedential decision on persecution on account of family membership.15 Six 
months later, Interim Attorney General Whitaker referred Matter of L-E-A- 
to himself, staying the decision and requesting amicus briefing on the 
circumstances under which an asylum claim based on family membership 
should be granted.16 On July 29, 2019, Attorney General Barr, who replaced 
Whitaker in February 2019, issued his decision, asserting that most families 
will not qualify as particular social groups.17 Family-based claims have since 
 
(set “Immigration Court” filter to Atlanta, “Fiscal Year of Decision” filter to 2018, and select 
“Decision” filter) (showing that the Atlanta immigration court granted only 14 applications 
out of 430, or 3%). 
12 The “refugee roulette” phrase was coined in Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz & Philip 
Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007). 
13 Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (B.I.A. 2018) (holding that an 
applicant must delineate all particular social groups on the record before the Immigration 
Judge and that the Board will generally not consider new groups not previously advanced 
before the Immigration Judge). 
14 See infra Section I, which presents an overview of the law, including analyses of multiple 
cases in which family was accepted as a cognizable particular social group and nexus was 
found to be satisfied. 
15 Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 41 (B.I.A. 2017). 
16 Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- II), 27 I. & N. Dec. 494 (Att’y Gen. 2018). The Attorney General 
may review decisions de novo under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) and supersede the authority of the 
immigration judge and the Board. Deportation Proceedings of Joseph Patrick Thomas 
Doherty, 12 Op. O.L.C. 1, 7 (1988). The previous two Attorneys General referred cases to 
themselves just four times in eight years whereas Attorney General Sessions certified seven 
cases to himself in the course of twenty-one months. Lorelei Laird, Whose Court Is This 
Anyway? Immigration Judges Accuse Executive Branch of Politicizing Their Courts, A.B.A. 
J. (Apr. 1, 2019), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/immigration-judges-execu 
tive-politicizing-courts [https://perma.cc/NPM2-4652]. 
17 L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 581. 
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become more difficult to win, though the decision and accompanying 
guidance from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)18 have 
recently been challenged in court.19 With the Administration aiming to make 
family-based particular social groups the latest casualty in its war on asylum 
seekers, the goal of this Article is for practitioners and legal scholars alike to 
understand the underpinnings of a family-based theory of persecution, the 
longstanding case law that supports it, and the dangers as well as the 
limitations of the Attorney General’s decision.  
Part I analyzes the existing state of the law on particular social groups 
involving families, including Matter of L-E-A-, circuit court rulings, 
unpublished decisions,20 as well as international and comparative 
jurisprudence. Part II explores the practical application of family-based 
particular social groups, offering lessons from case law about how best to 
argue both that a social group defined by family is cognizable and that nexus 
has been satisfied.  
 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE LAW 
 
To determine whether a particular social group is cognizable, an 
applicant must demonstrate that the group is (1) composed of members 
who share a common immutable characteristic; (2) is socially distinct; and 
(3) is defined with particularity.21  
 
18 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR PROCESSING REASONABLE FEAR, 
CREDIBLE FEAR, ASYLUM AND REFUGEE CLAIMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MATTER OF L-E-A- 
(2019), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2019/USCIS_Me 
morandum_LEA_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3PD-YJ8W] [hereinafter USCIS L-E-A- 
GUIDANCE]; Complaint at Exhibit A, S.A.P. v. Barr, No. 1:19-cv-03549 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 
2019) [hereinafter S.A.P. Complaint] (explaining the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 
Services’ September 2019 revisions to “Credible Fear of Persecution and Torture 
Determinations” training materials).  
19 See generally id.  
20 The unpublished decisions included in this Article are from the Center for Gender & 
Refugee Studies (CGRS) and the Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, L.L.C. (IRAC). 
CGRS collects decisions through its technical assistance program, which provides 
consultation and litigation resources to attorneys. Technical Assistance and Training, CTR. 
FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/technical-assistance-
training [https://perma.cc/4HAC-8J77] (last visited June 11, 2019). The IRAC publishes a 
monthly Index of Unpublished Decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals. See Index of 
Unpublished Decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE APP. 
CTR., www.irac.net [https://perma.cc/9QEE-HNK3] (last visited June 11, 2019). 
21 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014); see also Matter of A-B-, 27 
I. & N. Dec. 31, 320 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (articulating the same three-factor test). Although the 
Board endeavored to clarify the particularity and social distinction tests in Matter of M-E-V-
 
Vol. 5:3]                Family Fleeing: Family Membership as a Basis for Asylum 
 
 
7 
First, members of the group must share common characteristics which 
are either immutable or so fundamental that they cannot or “should not be 
required to change” them.22 Second, the group must be defined with sufficient 
particularity such that it has “well-defined boundaries” and constitutes a 
“discrete class of persons.”23 It must be easy to determine who is a member 
of the group and who is not. Thus, the terms used to describe the group must 
have “commonly accepted definitions in the society of which the group is a 
part.”24 Third, the social distinction prong requires that members of the group 
be “set apart, or distinct, from other persons within the society in some 
significant way. In other words . . . those with the characteristic in the society 
in question would be meaningfully distinguished from those who do not have 
it.”25 The Board explained, “The perception of the applicant’s persecutors 
may be relevant, because it can be indicative of whether society views the 
 
G- and its companion case, Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014), the more 
legally defensible standard for determining cognizability is that asserted in Matter of Acosta, 
that a particular social group must be defined by characteristics that are immutable or 
fundamental. Acosta was the first articulation by the Board of the legal standard for particular 
social group membership. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). It was not until decades 
later in Matter of S-E-G and Matter of E-A-G that the Board added the particularity and social 
distinction tests. 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582-83 (B.I.A. 2008); 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 593-94 
(B.I.A. 2008)   To impose additional requirements solely on social group claims and not the 
other protected grounds violates the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning “of the same 
kind.” See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. at 233 (using the ejusdem generis doctrine to interpret 
particular social group as requiring the same type of characteristics inherent in the other 
protected grounds in the refugee definition). In fact, not all circuits have applied Chevron 
deference to the Board’s imposition of the particularity and social distinction requirements. 
See, e.g., Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2013) (deferring to the Board’s 
definition of social group in Acosta while failing to mention S-E-G or E-A-G); W.G.A. v. 
Sessions, 900 F.3d 957, 964-65 & n.4 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Oct. 22, 2018) (refusing 
to make a Chevron determination about particularity and social distinction). While this 
Article argues that family-based particular social groups satisfy social distinction and 
particularity, this is not intended to validate the Board’s current approach to social group 
claims. 
22Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
23 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 245, 249; see also Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 
940, 944 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that the court will consider “whether the group can be 
defined with sufficient particularity to delimit its membership”); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & 
N. Dec. at 584 (“The essence of the ‘particularity’ requirement, therefore, is whether the 
proposed group can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct that the group 
would be recognized, in the society in question, as a discrete class of persons.”). 
24 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239; see also Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. 
& N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007) (rejecting the proposed group as “too amorphous to 
provide an adequate benchmark for determining group membership”). 
25 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 238; see also Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 
at 217 (requiring “evidence showing that society in general perceives, considers, or 
recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group”). 
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group as distinct. However, the persecutors’ perception is not itself enough 
to make a group socially distinct . . . .”26 The key inquiry is therefore whether 
the specific society views the group members as distinct and treats members 
differently in some way.27 
The majority of adjudicators agree that family-based particular 
social groups meet the requirements for cognizability.28 In Matter of Acosta, 
the first decision to define particular social group membership, the Board 
explicitly mentioned “kinship ties” as a characteristic that can comprise a 
cognizable social group.29 The Board went on to repeatedly refer to families 
as the paradigmatic example of a particular social group.30 Most of the 
circuit courts have joined the Board in accepting family-based groups as 
cognizable.31 There is widespread consensus that nuclear families can 
constitute a cognizable social group, and many adjudicators have also 
 
26 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 242. 
27 Id. 
28 See infra Section II.A for a more detailed discussion of how family-based particular social 
groups meet the requirements for cognizability. 
29 See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (“[W]e interpret the phrase 
‘persecution on account of membership in a particular social group’ to mean persecution that 
is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a 
common, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as 
sex, color, or kinship ties . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
30 See, e.g., Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006) (“Social groups based on 
. . . family relationship are generally easily recognizable and understood by others to 
constitute social groups.”); Matter of H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342 (B.I.A. 1996) (finding 
clan membership to constitute a cognizable particular social group because it was 
“inextricably linked to family ties”). 
31 See, e.g., Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he family remains the 
quintessential particular social group.”); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 125-26 
(4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) and the 
BIA opinion) (agreeing that family is a “prototypical” particular social group and finding the 
family members of “those who actively oppose gangs in El Salvador by agreeing to be 
prosecutorial witnesses” as sufficiently particular and socially distinct); Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 
585 F.3d 980, 995 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[A]s acknowledged by this court and by other circuits, a 
family is a ‘particular social group’ if it is recognizable as a distinctive subgroup of society.”); 
Vumi v. Gonzalez, 502 F.3d 150, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2007) (remanding a case to consider the 
applicant’s claim of persecution based on membership in her husband’s family and noting 
that that “the Board has held unambiguously that membership in a nuclear family may 
substantiate a social-group basis of persecution”); Bernal-Rendon v. Gonzalez, 419 F.3d 877, 881 
(8th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that “a nuclear family can constitute a social group”); Iliev v. INS, 
127 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1997) (confirming that that 7th Circuit case law “has suggested, with 
some certainty, that a family constitutes a cognizable ‘particular social group’ within the meaning 
of the law”); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (“There can, in fact, be no 
plainer example of a social group based on common, identifiable and immutable characteristics 
than that of the nuclear family.”); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(stating that the family provides “a prototypical example of ‘a particular social group’”). 
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recognized groups that encompass more extended family members.32   
In order to be eligible for asylum, applicants must demonstrate not only 
that they are members of a cognizable particular social group, but that there is a 
nexus to the persecution: that they were harmed because of this group 
membership.33 There is a longstanding recognition that persecutors may have 
mixed motives when targeting individuals; for that reason, so long as a protected 
ground was “one central reason” for the persecution, the nexus is deemed 
sufficient.34 Furthermore, the applicant does not bear the “unreasonable burden” 
of establishing the persecutor’s exact motivation35 but can satisfy the nexus 
requirement through direct evidence, such as statements made by the persecutor 
and circumstantial evidence including country conditions documentation, a 
pattern of harm to others similarly-situated, and the timing of the persecution.36 
 
32 See infra Subsection I.C.1 and Section II.A. 
33 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018) (including in the definition of a refugee that 
persecution be “on account of” a protected ground). The U.S. puts the burden of proof on the 
asylum seeker to provide evidence of the persecutor’s motive. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); INS. 
v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (holding that the applicant must provide at least 
some evidence of motive). “One central reason” for the persecution must be a protected 
ground, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), as amended by §101(a) of the REAL ID Act, P.L. 109-
13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005). However, adjudicators in the U.S. frequently ignore the doctrine of 
mixed motives and seem to require that the sole cause of the persecution be a Convention 
ground. See Michelle Foster, Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the 
Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 270-73 (2002) (stating that in practice, courts 
frequently apply the effective sole cause test by rejecting the Convention-related 
explanations for persecution and hypothesizing about the alternative non-Convention 
grounds for the persecution). Though beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that 
the UNHCR applies a lower burden of proof for a finding of nexus, for example indicating 
that “[o]ften the applicant himself may not be aware of the reasons for the persecution feared. 
It is not, however, his duty to analyze his case to such an extent as to identify the reasons in 
detail.” U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR 
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL 
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES ¶ 66 (1992). Some foreign jurisdictions, such as 
Canada, also apply a less stringent nexus test, requiring that a Convention ground be “a 
reason” but not “one central reason” for the persecution. See infra note 209. 
34 Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007) (“[T]he protected ground 
cannot play a minor role . . . . That is, it cannot be incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate 
to another reason for harm. Rather, it must be a central reason for persecuting the respondent”); 
see also Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 130 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The INA expressly 
contemplates mixed motives for persecution when it specifies that a protected ground must be 
‘one central reason’ for the persecution.” (citing to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i))).  
35 Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988). 
36 See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (describing how plaintiffs must 
provide proof of a persecutors’ motives, but that proof may be direct or circumstantial); see 
also RAIO COMBINED TRAINING COURSE: NEXUS AND THE PROTECTED GROUNDS, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.18-20 (2012), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/ 
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In the context of particular social group claims, whether or not the 
persecution was on account of the applicant’s membership in the group is a 
question that should be entirely separate from inquiries into whether the group 
is cognizable and whether the applicant is a member of the group. It is possible 
for an applicant to present a cognizable particular social group and to 
demonstrate membership in this group, but then for the adjudicator to find that 
there is insufficient evidence that one central reason that the persecutor harmed 
the applicant was the group membership. Social group cognizability is 
usually considered a legal issue with nexus typically categorized as a 
finding of fact.37 This distinction is significant because findings of fact are 
reviewed by the Board under a “clearly erroneous” standard,38 whereas questions 
of law may be reviewed de novo.39 Similarly, the federal courts of appeal limit 
their review to questions of law40 and treat findings of fact as conclusive “unless 
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”41 
As such, adjudicators predisposed to deny asylum may do so based on a lack of 
nexus, interpreting the facts to support the conclusion that the persecutor was not 
motivated by the family relationship. Ruling on nexus rather than social group 
cognizability increases the likelihood that a decision will survive appeal given 
the highly deferential standard of review for findings of fact. 
 
A. Purported Circuit Split  
 
Some circuits considering family-based cases have consistently 
questioned whether the persecutor was motivated by reasons unrelated to family 
membership, such as general criminal intent, a desire for financial gain, or 
 
files/nativedocuments/Nexus_minus_PSG_RAIO_Lesson_Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYX3-
N8LF] (outlining examples of direct and circumstantial evidence of the persecutor’s motive). 
37 See, e.g., Hincaipe v. Att’y Gen., 494 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[T]he question of 
whether persecution is on account of . . . protected grounds is fact-specific.”); Silva v. 
Attorney General, 448 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the review of 
petitioner’s credible evidence of past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution is 
considered an administrative fact finding); Jahed v. INS, 356 F.3d 991, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(“Whether persecution is ‘on account of’ a petitioner’s political opinion is a question of fact; 
it turns on evidence about the persecutor’s motive.”). But see Menghesha v. Gonzales, 450 
F.3d 142, 147 (4th Cir. 2006) (“In this instance, however, we are concerned with the IJ’s 
legal conclusions, not factual findings. We find that the IJ erred as a matter of law in holding 
[petitioner] to an overly stringent legal standard: proving that political persecution was the 
government’s sole motive.”); Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(addressing the sufficiency of the petitioner’s testimony about motive as a legal question). 
38 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2019). 
39 Id. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii). 
40 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2018). 
41 Id. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  
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revenge.42 Others, in particular the Fourth Circuit, have been more inclined to 
find nexus to the family-based particular social group even when the persecutor 
also had other reasons for targeting the victim unrelated to a protected ground.43 
Another central dispute around family claims among the circuits focuses on the 
reason the initial family member was targeted (hereinafter referred to as the 
“defining family member”). There is considerable variation among the courts as 
to whether the “defining family member” need also have been persecuted on 
account of a protected ground in order for the applicant to be eligible for asylum.  
For example, in Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, the petitioner’s brother, a gang 
member, was killed by a rival gang, after which the petitioner, her parents, and 
her brother’s wife were threatened.44 The facts do not support any obvious claim 
for refugee protection by the “defining family” member, the deceased brother in 
this case. Given that the brother may not have been himself targeted on account 
of a protected ground, it is unclear whether this would disqualify the petitioner’s 
family as a cognizable particular social group. However, the Fifth Circuit 
essentially circumvented the issue by concluding that the gangs were targeting 
the petitioner, not because of her family relationship, but to obtain information 
that they believed her brother had given her,45 noting, “there is no reason to 
suppose that those who persecute to obtain information also do so out of 
hatred for a family, or vice versa.”46 The Court explicitly declined to address 
the issue of whether the petitioner’s proposed particular social group of her 
family was cognizable.47  
Reaching more directly the issue of whether the “defining family 
member” need be persecuted on account of a protected ground, the Seventh 
Circuit in Yin Guan Lin v. Holder considered the case of a Chinese petitioner 
who was threatened and detained by debt collectors from whom his father had 
borrowed money.48 In denying the petition to review, the Court acknowledged 
that “the family unit can constitute a social group” but found that the petitioner’s 
 
42 See, e.g., Marin-Portillo v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[T]he record 
adequately supports the IJ’s finding . . . that the threats against [petitioner] stemmed not from 
. . . kinship ties . . ., but rather . . . retaliation”); Cambara-Cambara v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 822, 
824-26 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that persecution based on wealth is not a cognizable social 
group and targeting only wealthy family members fails to provide the required nexus); 
Demiraj v. Holder, 631 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding that the persecution against 
petitioner was based on revenge as opposed to family ties); see also infra note 103 
(discussing cases in which the persecutors were found to be motivated by financial gain).  
43 For Fourth Circuit case law following Matter of L-E-A-, see infra Subsection I.C.3. 
44 Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 2015). 
45 See id. at 492-93 (differentiating between persecuting to obtain information about a relative 
and persecuting because of status as a relative). 
46 Id. at 493. 
47 Id. at 492. 
48 Yin Guan Lin v. Holder, 411 F. App’x 901, 903 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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persecution was not on account of his family membership.49 The Court 
concluded, “[a]ny harm that Lin faced arose from a personal dispute between his 
father and his father's creditors. Debtors who fear creditors do not qualify for 
social-group membership.”50 Because the “defining family member” had been 
targeted due to what the Court deemed to be a personal dispute around 
attempts to collect a debt, his son was also not eligible for protection.51  
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch remanded 
a case involving a petitioner who had been threatened by gang members who 
wanted her son to join the gang.52 The Board denied asylum based on lack of 
nexus, finding that the petitioner was threatened because she opposed her son’s 
involvement in criminal activity rather than on account of her family 
membership.53 Even though the petitioner’s son had not been harmed for a 
protected reason,54 the Fourth Circuit concluded, “Hernandez’s relationship to 
her son is why she, and not another person, was threatened with death if she 
did not allow him to join Mara 18, and the gang members’ demands leveraged 
her maternal authority to control her son’s activities.”55 The Ninth Circuit came 
to a similar decision in Flores-Rios v. Lynch, in which the petitioner argued that 
he had been persecuted because of his family’s opposition to a gang, including 
that his cousin had agreed to testify against a gang member.56 The Court 
remanded the case to address whether the petitioner had been persecuted due to 
his family membership, citing to previous precedent in which the Circuit had 
“declined to hold . . . ‘that a family can constitute a particular social group 
 
49 See id. at 905 (qualifying how the family unit may be a social group). 
50 Id. at 905-06. It is not entirely clear from the decision, but the court seemed to imply that 
the very cognizability of the petitioner’s particular social group turned on whether his father 
had been persecuted on account of a protected ground, a position that conflates the separate 
issues of cognizability and nexus. 
51 Id. 
52 Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 947 (4th Cir. 2015). 
53 Id. at 949. 
54 Cases involving gang recruitment have been largely unsuccessful, finding a lack of nexus 
to a protected ground. See, e.g., Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 590 (B.I.A. 2008) 
(“We concur with the Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondents failed to demonstrate 
that either Salvadoran youth who refused recruitment into the MS-13 criminal gang or their 
family members constitute a particular social group.”); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
591 (B.I.A. 2008) (“[W]e find that the particular social group identified by the Immigration 
Judge as ‘persons resistant to gang membership’ lacks the social visibility that would allow 
others to identify its members as part of such a group.”). 
55 See Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 950 (describing how family ties do not have to be the 
central or even the dominant reason for persecution, but that they must only be more than an 
incidental or superficial reason). 
56 Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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only when the alleged persecution on that ground is intertwined with’ another 
protected ground.”57  
In 2016, the Board published an amicus invitation to consider the question: 
Where an asylum applicant has demonstrated persecution 
because of his or her membership in a particular social group 
comprised of the applicant’s family, has he or she satisfied the 
nexus requirement without further analysis? Or does the 
family constitute a particular social group only if the defining 
family member also was targeted on account of another 
protected ground?58 
The Board specifically requested that parties compare the Fourth 
Circuit’s Hernandez-Avalos and the Ninth Circuit’s Flores Rios with the Fifth 
Circuit’s Ramirez-Mejia and the Seventh Circuit’s Lin v. Holder.59 Although 
the Board in effect was indicating that there was a circuit split, a closer read of 
the named cases––as well as additional case law across jurisdictions––reveals 
that the inconsistencies in rulings may not actually rise to the level of a split.60 
Regardless, it is clear that the issue was ripe for the Board’s consideration given 
that adjudicators at all levels in all circuits were, and still are, applying 
 
57 See id. at 1128 (citing to Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th Cir. 
2005), judgment vacated, 547 U.S. 183 (2006)); see also Hernandez-Ramos v. Sessions, 686 
F. App’x 385, 387 (9th Cir. 2017) (indicating that the B.I.A. applied the incorrect legal 
standard in requiring that the respondent provide evidence that the deaths of his family 
members occurred on account of a protected ground); Sanchez-Canizalez v. Holder, 520 F. 
App’x 528, 530 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the petitioner was not required to show that 
another family member was persecuted on account of a protected ground). 
58 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Amicus Invitation, No. 16-01-11 (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www. 
justice.gov/eoir/file/811976/download [perma.cc/A7RL-HKUE].  
59 The amicus invitation also included the Eight Circuit’s Malonga v. Holder in the category 
of circuits that require nexus as to the “defining family member.” 621 F.3d 757 (8th Cir. 
2010). However, this case is not as instructive in the analysis of social group claims because 
the petitioner did not actually assert that he was targeted on account of his family 
membership, but rather relied on political opinion and ethnicity claims. Id.at 763. The 
petitioner did argue that his father, wife, and child were harmed, but the court did not comment 
on the extent to which the facts might support a family-based argument. Id. Although not 
referenced in the amicus invitation, it is also worth noting that the First Circuit joined the Fourth 
Circuit and Ninth Circuit in clearly stating that the “defining family member” need not 
demonstrate nexus to a protected ground. See Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9, 15 (1st 
Cir. 2014) (“The law in this circuit and others is clear that a family may be a particular social 
group simply by virtue of its kinship ties, without requiring anything more.”). 
60 A deeper dive into this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. For more, see, e.g., Rachel 
M. Lee, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Board of Immigration Appeals Must Remind 
Courts That Family Is the Quintessential Particular Social Group to Prevent Courts from 
Sidestepping Family-Based Asylum Claims, 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 405, 427 (2017) (arguing 
the “purported circuit split does not exist” because “the cases identified as creating a split 
merely add ambiguity to the issue and do not directly contradict the well-settled precedent”). 
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inconsistent reasoning to cases involving family-based targeting and often 
conflating the separate issues of cognizability and nexus. In fact, the Board’s 
amicus instruction itself appears to do just this by suggesting that the 
cognizability of a social group defined by family might depend on the 
motivations of the persecutor.61 The Board attempted to clarify the parameters 
of permissible family-based claims in its first published decision on the issue, 
Matter of L-E-A-, but still left quite a bit of room for confusion.  
 
B. Matter of L-E-A- as Decided by the Board 
 
Despite conflating the issues in its amicus invitation, the Board 
analyzed the cognizability of the particular social group in L-E-A- 
independently from nexus and explicitly acknowledged this distinction, 
citing to Matter of W-G-R-, which emphasized the need to “separate the 
assessment [of] whether the applicant has established the existence of one of 
the enumerated grounds . . . from the issue of nexus. The structure of the Act 
supports preserving this distinction, which should not be blurred . . . .”62 In 
L-E-A-, the Mexican respondent faced threats from cartel members after his 
father refused to let them sells drugs in his store.63 The cartel members also 
approached the respondent himself to ask him to sell drugs from his father’s 
store, and he refused.64 The Board opened by recognizing that the particular 
social group consisting of the respondent’s father’s immediate family was 
cognizable, citing much of the aforementioned case law as well as the fact that 
both parties were in agreement on the issue.65 In its supplemental brief 
submitted in response to the Board’s amicus invitation, the Department of 
Homeland Security (“the Department” or “DHS”) asserted that an immediate 
family member will “generally meet the social distinction test” since “virtually 
all societies draw significant distinctions” around immediate family 
relationships.66 The Board accepted this reasoning, stating that the respondent, a 
son living at home with his father, was undoubtedly a member of the particular 
social group.67 The Board did not squarely address the limits of cognizability 
 
61 See id. (asking whether a family group needs to show that “the defining family member 
was also targeted on account of another protected ground” in order to constitute a particular 
social group). 
62 Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 43 (B.I.A. 2017) (citing to Matter of W-
G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 218 (B.I.A. 2014)). 
63 Id. at 41. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 43. 
66 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Supplemental Brief at 9, In re Alba, No. A200 553 090 (B.I.A. 
2016) [hereinafter DHS 2016 Brief]. 
67 L-E-A- I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 43. 
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when it comes to family-based particular social group membership. However, 
leaving room for groups beyond nuclear families, the decision peripherally 
mentioned that “the inquiry in a claim based on family membership will depend 
on the nature and degree of the relationships involved and how those 
relationships are regarded by the society in question.”68 This statement aligns 
with the Department’s suggestion in its brief that in some societies, “extended 
family groupings may have greater social significance, such that they could 
meet the requirement of social distinction.”69  
Having taken no issue with the particular social group, the Board 
turned next to nexus. The Board first laid out the “easy” scenarios in which 
nexus to a particular social group defined by family would clearly be found––
where a persecutor has an animus against the family itself70 or where the family 
status is connected to another protected ground, such as political opinion.71 The 
Board then contended that “nexus is not established simply because a particular 
social group of family members exists and the family members experience 
harm,”72 or because the persecutor targeted the victim as a means to an end, 
“especially if the end is not connected to another protected ground.”73 
Through this repeated commentary about the relevancy of connecting the 
persecution to a non-family-based protected ground, the Board intimated that 
a family-based claim should fail where the “defining family member” was 
not persecuted for Convention reasons.74 However, in the final footnote of 
the decision, the Board made the opposite point, saying, “[w]e accept the 
parties’ position that a separate, independent inquiry into the motivation of a 
persecutor towards the respondent’s father, as the defining or primary family 
member, is not part of the nexus calculus.”75 
The Board ultimately interpreted the facts of the case to find that there 
was no nexus to the respondent’s family relationship because the cartel was 
motivated only by a desire to increase its profits.76 L-E-A- thus mirrored much 
of the existing precedent: acknowledging the cognizability of family-based 
particular social groups, offering seemingly contradictory statements around 
nexus and the requirements as to the “defining family member,” and 
 
68 Id.  
69 DHS 2016 Brief, supra note 66, at 9. 
70 L-E-A- I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 44 (giving as an example the Bolshevik assassinations of the 
Romanovs). 
71 Id. at 45 (citing to Ayele v. Holder, 564 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2009); Vumi v. Gonzales, 502 
F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2007); Gebremichael v. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
72L-E-A- I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 45. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 46 n.5. 
76 Id. at 46-47. 
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ultimately circumventing the issue entirely by defaulting to the position that 
the respondent was not harmed due to his family membership at all.  
 
C. Board Decisions Post–L-E-A- 
 
In the wake of the Board’s decision in L-E-A-, there remained a lack 
of clarity around how to analyze family-based asylum claims. At the 
immigration judge level, decisions have been varied, with some judges 
challenging the very cognizability of family-based particular social groups 
and others easily finding nexus.77 The Board has not published any further 
decisions implicating family-based particular social group membership since 
L-E-A-. Of the eleven unpublished Board decisions subsequent to L-E-A- that 
were identified in researching this Article, four of the appeals were dismissed 
and seven sustained. Although unpublished decisions have no precedential 
value, it is still instructive to delve into the reasoning of such decisions to 
identify some patterns in how the Board analyzed family-based claims 
subsequent to its decision in L-E-A-. 
 
1. Family-based particular social groups, including those involving 
extended families, can be cognizable 
 
Ten out of eleven of the unpublished Board decisions found the 
family-based particular social group that the respondents had asserted to be 
cognizable. For the most part, the Board did not engage in any kind of robust 
rationale for this finding, indicating that the cognizability of a social group 
comprised of family members remained uncontroversial following the 
Board’s decision. However, this limited analysis is exactly what Attorney 
General Barr used to justify his overruling of the Board’s cognizability 
finding in Matter of L-E-A-.78  
The Board also accepted, with virtually no discussion, family-based 
particular social groups consisting of non-nuclear family members in three of 
the eleven cases. In one, Matter of H-G-N-, the Board found the respondent’s 
family unit to be a cognizable group and explicitly noted that it encompassed 
 
77 Of the eight unpublished immigration judge decisions post–L-E-A- collected for this 
Article, three were grants of relief and five were referrals. There were no clear patterns in 
decision-making that I could glean, nor is a set of eight decisions from eight different judges 
a particularly good data set from which to draw any conclusions. As such, these decisions 
are not analyzed as a whole, but are instead described throughout this Article as applicable. 
78 Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- II), 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 596 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (finding that the 
Board “summarily concluded” the case involved a valid particular social group “without 
explaining how the facts supported this finding or satisfied the particularity and social 
visibility requirements”). 
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his aunt, uncle, cousins, and siblings.79 However, in that case the respondent 
and his siblings had moved in with his aunt’s family at the age of seven after 
his mother relocated to the United States, so it could be argued that his aunt’s 
family had effectively become his nuclear family. In one of the other cases, 
the Board and the immigration judge took no issue with the social group 
defined as the respondent’s family, which included extended family 
members.80 In a third unpublished decision, the Board accepted the 
cognizability of the particular social group “relatives of persons who testified 
and are/were prosecution witnesses against transnational criminal groups,” 
where the “defining family member” was the respondent’s cousin.81 The 
Board cited to past precedent “acknowledging the Board’s definition of a 
legally cognizable particular social group”82 and indicated without further 
discussion that the social group in this case was cognizable. Again, this 
perfunctory recognition of cognizability will likely not be so widespread in 
future decisions involving family-based claims given Barr’s recent critique 
of such a “cursory treatment” in Matter of L-E-A-.83 
 
2. Cognizability and nexus continue to be conflated  
 
Although the Board stated in L-E-A- that the cognizability of the 
particular social group and nexus should not be conflated,84 the Board made just 
this conflation in a decision less than one month after L-E-A- was issued. The 
Board considered the case of a Honduran respondent who had been threatened 
and assaulted by his father, a gang member, who wanted him to join the gang as 
well as to turn over to the gang a house that had been left to the respondent.85 
The Board concluded that, “[w]hile an immediate family is typically recognized 
as a cognizable particular social group under the Act, the facts in this particular 
case do not support a finding that the respondent has met his burden that he is a 
member of a cognizable social group” because only he and one other member of 
the group, identified as nuclear family members of his father, were targeted.86  
 
79 H-G-N-, A XXX XXX 536, 2 (B.I.A. Mar. 14, 2019) (on file with the IRAC).  
80 Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 19905, (B.I.A. undated but post–
L-E-A-). 
81 Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 25459, 4 (B.I.A. July 26, 2017). 
82 Id. 
83 L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 596. 
84 Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 43 (B.I.A. 2017) (citing Matter of W-G-R-, 
26 I.&N. Dec. 208, 218 (B.I.A. 2014)). 
85 Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 16808, 2-3 (B.I.A. June 16, 
2017). 
86 Id. 
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The Board implied that the lack of evidence that the persecutor was 
motivated by the family relationship in and of itself indicated that the group was 
not cognizable. The Board noted, “[there is no external threat against the nuclear 
family of X, the defining attribute of the respondent’s proposed social group is 
his persecution by his own father, and the risk of persecution alone does not 
create a particular social group.”87 This analysis conflates the question of the 
cognizability of a particular social group with whether the persecution suffered 
was on account of this group, which should be two separate inquiries. This case 
appears to be an outlier since the Board separately analyzed the cognizability of 
the particular social group and whether there was a nexus in the other ten 
unpublished decisions consulted for this Section. Nevertheless, this decision 
reflects the Board’s tendency to ignore that there should be separate inquiries 
into whether a particular social group’s construction is permissible and whether 
the persecutor was motivated by the applicant’s membership in the group.  
 
3. Nexus is more likely to be found in Fourth Circuit cases 
 
Six of the seven positive unpublished BIA decisions identified for this 
Article arose in the Fourth Circuit, where the precedent is much more 
favorable.88 The Fourth Circuit has warned in family-based cases against an 
“excessively narrow interpretation” of the nexus standard that focuses on the 
immediate cause of the persecution rather than the bigger picture.89 In the Fourth 
Circuit, it appears that the “defining family member” need not have been targeted 
on account of a protected ground, and the Court is much less likely to find that 
the persecutor was motivated by “personal reasons” rather than membership in 
the particular social group consisting of the applicant’s family.90 
For example, in Cruz v. Sessions, the Honduran respondent had 
considered going to the police after her common law husband was killed by 
a member of an organized crime group. She asserted a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of her membership in the group: “nuclear family 
members of Johnny Martinez.”91 The immigration judge concluded that the 
“main reason” that the respondent had been threatened was to convince her 
not to go to the police and the Board adopted this conclusion, adding “[h]arm 
meted out by a private actor for personal reasons or solely on general levels 
 
87 Id. at 2.  
88 In fact, the Board acknowledged in L-E-A- that the case may have been decided differently 
in the Fourth Circuit. L-E-A- I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 46 n.3.  
89 Cruz v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 122, 129 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (Mar. 14, 2017). 
90 See id. at 130 (criticizing the BIA’s conclusion that the applicant was persecuted for 
“personal reasons”). 
91 Id. at 126.  
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of crime and violence in Honduras” did not qualify for asylum or withholding 
of removal.92 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit held “that the BIA and IJ applied 
an improper and excessively narrow interpretation of the evidence relevant 
to the statutory nexus requirement.”93 The Court explained that it was a 
“shortsighted[]” approach to only consider the persecutor’s stated objective 
of preventing the petitioner from reporting him to the police when the very 
reason that she had investigated her husband’s disappearance was their family 
relationship.94 The Court did not even speak to the motivations of the 
persecutor in harming the respondent’s husband, demonstrating the 
irrelevance of nexus for the “defining family member” in the Fourth Circuit. 
Similarly, in Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, in which the Honduran 
petitioner’s family store was targeted for extortion by gang members, the 
Fourth Circuit determined that “the IJ and BIA erred by focusing narrowly 
on the ‘immediate trigger’ for MS-13’s assaults—greed or revenge—at the 
expense of Salgado-Sosa’s relationship to his stepfather and family, which 
were the very relationships that prompted the asserted persecution.”95 The 
Court further criticized the Board for improperly focusing on whether the 
“defining family member” was persecuted on account of a protected 
ground, reiterating that this is not a requirement for asylum eligibility.96 
Given the similarities in facts to L-E-A-, also a case involving extortion of 
a family business, the Fourth Circuit’s differing conclusion here is 
particularly striking. 
Since L-E-A-, the Board has cited to these decisions (and others in 
the same vein)97 to remand cases arising in the Fourth Circuit, where it has 
been foreclosed from applying its otherwise largely restrictive 
interpretation of the nexus standard. In Matter of C-O-M-, a case involving 
a wife who was targeted after her husband resisted extortion by gang 
members, the Board wrote, “[t]his case arises within the jurisdiction of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which has cautioned 
this Board against applying an excessively narrow interpretation of the 
nexus requirement in cases involving particular social groups defined by 
 
92 Id. at 126-27. 
93 Id. at 129. 
94 Id. 
95 Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451, 458 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing to Oliva v. Lynch, 807 
F.3d 53, 60 (4th Cir. 2015)). 
96 Id. at 458-59. 
97 See generally Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2017) (reversing the 
BIA’s determination that petitioner did not show persecution due to a familial relationship); 
cf. Velasquez v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 188, 196 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding that a custody dispute 
between relatives did not satisfy nexus). 
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family identity.”98 In another decision, Matter of H-G-N-, the Board found 
nexus where a man was threatened after his aunt did not pay extortion and 
concluded, “[t]he critical assessment under Fourth Circuit precedent is 
whether the familial reason is why the applicant, rather than another 
person, was targeted.”99 Per a straightforward reading of the statutory 
language around nexus, it seems that this should be the key question for 
all cases of family-based persecution regardless of the circuit in which 
they arise.100 The fact that the Board distinguished the Fourth Circuit from 
others in this way further indicates the Board’s proclivity for finding no 
nexus in family-based claims when not limited by federal court precedent. 
Aside from the Fourth Circuit, there has been limited circuit court 
jurisprudence on family-based asylum claims since the Board’s decision in 
L-E-A-. The circuits appear to have largely proceeded with the same posture 
they previously held, with the Seventh Circuit going so far as to explicitly 
note that, “L-E-A- did not establish a new rule. As the government agreed at 
oral argument, L-E-A- applied the same analysis that the Board has followed 
since at least 2007.”101 The majority of circuits continue to recognize family-
based groups as cognizable, but tend to find on the facts that a non-protected 
reason was what motivated the persecution.102 This appears to be a particularly 
 
98 C-O-M-, A XXX XXX 428, 2 (B.I.A. June 22, 2018) (on file with the IRAC); see also P-
R-R-, A XXX XXX 272, 2 (B.I.A. Feb. 22, 2019) (on file with the IRAC) (describing the 
Fourth Circuit as having found the Board to be “shortsighted” in its analysis of nexus in Cruz 
v. Sessions); K-A-A-P-, A XXX XXX 625, 2 (B.I.A. Mar. 7, 2019) (on file with the IRAC) 
(“The Fourth Circuit has found nexus to family relationship when the alien was threatened 
as a result of or as revenge for the acts of a family member.”).  
99 H-G-N-, A XXX XXX 536, 2 (B.I.A. Mar. 14, 2019) (on file with the IRAC).  
100 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2018) (“[T]he applicant must establish that [a protected 
ground] was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”). 
101 W.G.A. v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 957, 963 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Oct. 22, 2018). 
102 See, e.g., Lopez v. Barr, 773 Fed. App’x 459, 462 (10th Cir. 2019) (reasoning that the 
nexus did not exist where the applicant was threatened for helping her sister escape abuse, 
because the persecutor would have threatened anyone who had helped her sister regardless 
of whether they were related); Diaz-Rivas v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 769 Fed. App’x 748, 755 
(11th Cir. 2019) (deferring to the BIA’s determination that the gang targeted the petitioner 
for reporting her brother-in-law’s disappearance rather than because of their family 
relationship); Sosa-Perez v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 74, 81 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding insufficient 
evidence that the attacks on the applicant’s family were due to family status rather than 
widespread criminality); Ruiz-Escobar v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 2018) 
(finding that petitioner failed to establish nexus following a break-in because he did not know 
who the persecutors were looking for or why); Revencu v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 396, 405 (5th 
Cir. 2018), as revised (Aug. 2, 2018) (holding that the persecution of the applicant’s wife did 
not establish asylum eligibility where he was not also targeted); Rivas v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 
537, 542 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding the record did not sufficiently show that petitioner’s family 
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popular viewpoint in cases involving extortion where the alternative perception 
of the persecutor’s motivation as purely pecuniary has frequently prevailed.103 
By reaching this conclusion, the circuits have continued to avoid the need to 
squarely address the question of whether the “defining family member” need 
have been persecuted on account of a protected ground. 
 
D. Matter of L-E-A- as Decided by the Attorney General 
 
In December 2018, Acting Attorney General Whitaker certified 
Matter of L-E-A- to himself, staying the Board’s decision and requesting 
briefing on the question: “Whether, and under what circumstances, an alien 
may establish persecution on account of membership in a ‘particular social 
group’ . . . based on the alien’s membership in a family unit.”104 
Previewing the Attorney General’s posture, DHS argued 
emphatically in its February 2019 brief not only against finding nexus in 
claims involving family-based targeting, but also against the heretofore 
largely unchallenged cognizability of particular social groups defined by 
 
membership was the reason for her persecution rather than her status as a witness to her 
brother’s murder); Quero-Quero v. Sessions, 740 F. App’x 140, 140 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing 
to L-E-A- and denying the petition for review because there was insufficient nexus between 
petitioner’s family membership and the persecution);  Alvarez v. Sessions, 739 F. App’x 
372, 375 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding without factual discussion that there was insufficient 
nexus between petitioner’s familial relationships and his feared harm); Maravilla v. Sessions, 
695 F. App’x 179, 180 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that petitioner failed to prove that her family 
membership was “at least one central reason” she was targeted for extortion). 
103 See, e.g., Cruz-Guzman v. Barr, 920 F.3d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Cruz’s evidence 
does not show that 18th Street’s actions were motivated by a particular animus toward the 
Cruz-Guzman family itself, as opposed to an ordinary criminal desire for financial gain.”); 
Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 746 F. App’x 869, 872 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[S]ubstantial evidence supports 
the BIA and IJ’s conclusion that the threat Orozco’s aunt levied against Orozco was 
motivated by a personal dispute, namely, money . . . . ”); Betancourt-Aplicano v. Sessions, 
747 F. App’x 279, 284 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[W]here threats made against a family member are 
simply ‘a means to achieve the [robbers’] objective to increase [their] profits,’ there is no 
nexus.” (quoting Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 46-47 (B.I.A. 2017))); 
Macias-Padilla v. Sessions, 729 F. App’x 541, 543 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he record indicates 
the cartel was criminally motivated to obtain money.”); Sanchez v. Sessions, 706 F. App’x 
897, 899 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A]ny persecution or fear of future persecution was not because 
of Ramirez’s membership in a particular social group, but rather because of the criminals’ 
desire to rob the hotel for which her husband worked.”); Center for Gender & Refugee 
Studies Database Case No. 28588, (B.I.A. July 16, 2018) (“The respondent left El Salvador 
because of a fear of criminal violence and extortion by gang members, conditions which are 
widespread in El Salvador. However, individuals who are fleeing general conditions of 
violence in a country do not qualify for asylum or withholding of removal under the Act.”). 
104 Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- II), 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 584 (Att’y Gen. 2018).  
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family.105 This stance represented a complete about-face from the 
Department’s position in its 2016 brief in L-E-A- that “[o]rdinarily, in many, 
if not most societies, an ‘immediate family’ unit . . . will qualify as a 
cognizable particular social group.”106 In contrast, in its 2019 brief, the 
Department asserted, “excluding such family relationship-based protection 
claims would not be inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the 1967 
Protocol . . . . ”107 The Department in its 2019 brief further urged the Attorney 
General to find that “protection claims purportedly based on membership in 
a family unit will ordinarily fail to satisfy the all-important nexus 
requirement.”108 To justify this position, the Department asserted that most 
persecutors harm their victims not because of their family membership but on 
account of “personal disputes,” which are not a protected ground.109 The 
Department listed out common scenarios that implicate family-based targeting, 
including issues between families; intrafamilial conflicts; domestic violence; 
punishment or retaliation; and threats arising from extortion,110 concluding that 
in each of these scenarios, a “personal dispute” rather than family membership 
is likely to have motivated the persecution.111 The Department was silent as to 
the question of whether the “defining family member” need demonstrate nexus, 
as if this issue were irrelevant given the improbability of finding that the 
persecutor targeted the victim due to a family relationship. 
On July 29, 2019, Attorney General Barr issued his decision, overruling 
the Board’s recognition of the respondent’s particular social group as 
cognizable and asserting that most families––including nuclear families––fail 
the social distinction test and therefore will not qualify as particular social 
groups.112 Barr did not comment on nexus, except to indicate that he was not 
overruling that portion of the Board’s decision.113 The Board’s finding that the 
respondent’s persecutors were motivated by financial gain, rather than a 
protected ground,114 remains undisturbed. Taking a cue from Matter of A-B-,115 
 
105 See generally Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Supplemental Brief, Matter of L-E-A, Respondent, 
27 I. & N. Dec. 40 (B.I.A. 2017) [hereinafter DHS 2019 Brief]. 
106 DHS 2016 Brief, supra note 66, at 1. 
107 DHS 2019 Brief, supra note 105, at 2.  
108 Id. at 31. 
109 See id. at 27 (labeling one section as “Claims for Protection Are Unsuccessful When 
Arising from Personal Disputes and Portrayed as Membership in a Family Unit-Based 
Particular Social Group”).  
110 Id. at 29-32. 
111 Id. at 32. 
112 L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 581. 
113 Id. at 597. 
114 L-E-A- I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 46-47. 
115 L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 588-89 (citing to Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 333-
36 (Att’y Gen. 2018)). 
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Barr’s decision turned on the critique that the Board improperly relied on the 
parties’ agreement on the cognizability of the respondent’s particular social 
group rather than engaging in a detailed factual analysis.116 Alongside this 
narrow holding, Barr also took the opportunity to include far-reaching dicta 
about family-based particular social groups more generally. He argued that 
cases finding families to be a particular social group should not be followed if 
they were decided prior to M-E-V-G- and W-G-R- in 2014 when the Board 
clarified the particularity and social distinction requirements.117 He also 
maintained that many of the decisions following 2014 that accepted groups 
defined by family should be given no weight because they failed to adequately 
assess particularity and social distinction118 or “relied upon outdated dicta from 
the Board’s early cases.”119 
Having summarily dismissed the decades of Board and circuit case 
law recognizing the cognizability of family-based particular social groups, 
Barr devoted a paragraph to underscoring his authority as Attorney General 
to interpret immigration law.120 He then proceeded to assert an interpretation 
of family-based particular social group membership that requires applicants 
to demonstrate that their specific families are well-known and distinct in 
some way in their societies.121 For over a decade prior to 2019, USCIS 
instructed its asylum officers that “[t]he question here is not whether a 
specific family is well-known or visible in the society. Rather, the question 
is whether that society views the degree of relationship shared by group 
members as so significant that the society distinguishes groups of people 
based on that type of relationship.”122 In contrast, under Barr’s interpretation 
in Matter of L-E-A-, adjudicators must “focus on the particular social group 
as it is defined by the applicant and ask whether that group is distinct in the 
society in question . . . . It is not sufficient to observe that the applicant’s 
society (or societies in general) place great significance on the concept of 
the family.”123 The Attorney General concluded that most families would 
not be able to meet this standard124 and found that the respondent in L-E-A- 
failed to establish a cognizable particular social group because he “did not 
 
116 Id. at 584, 586. 
117 Id. at 588-90. 
118 Id. At 589. 
119 Id. At 590-91. 
120 Id. at 591-92. 
121 Id. at 594. 
122 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, 
ELIGIBILITY PART III: NEXUS 33 (2009) https://www.aila.org/infonet/aobt-lesson-nexus-five 
-protected-characteristics [https://perma.cc/DRK7-9U23]. 
123 L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 594. 
124 Id. at 594. 
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show that anyone, other than perhaps the cartel, viewed the respondent’s 
family to be distinct in Mexican society.”125 
On September 30, 2019, USCIS published guidance “in accordance 
with Matter of L-E-A-” directing USCIS employees to “no longer recognize 
family-based particular social groups based only on the general significance of 
family relationships in the society in question” but to require that the specific 
family be well-known or essentially famous in the society.126 The guidance also 
notes that “[o]fficers should be alert that . . . the Attorney General predicted that 
the average or ordinary family typically will not meet the standard, because it 
will not have the kind of identifying characteristics that render a specific family 
socially distinct within the society in question.”127 USCIS also amended its 
Asylum Division Officer Training Course on credible fear and torture 
determinations to quote heavily from L-E-A- with similar instructions.128 
Given the recency of the Attorney General’s decision, there has been 
limited jurisprudence since on cases involving family relationships. 
However, attorneys around the country have reported receiving negative 
determinations in cases of family-based targeting that seemingly would have 
been granted prior to L-E-A-. In November 2019, the Catholic Legal 
Immigration Network (CLINIC) brought a lawsuit challenging the new 
USCIS guidance on behalf of thirteen plaintiffs who were subjected to 
expedited removal orders following application of this new guidance.129 
The plaintiffs are all individuals who would most likely have been found 
to have a credible or reasonable fear130 prior to Barr’s 2019 decision, 
 
125 Id. at 592. 
126 USCIS L-E-A- GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 3. 
127 Id. at 7. 
128 See generally U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER 
TRAINING COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION AND TORTURE DETERMINATIONS 
(2019), https://www.aila.org/infonet/uscis-updates-officer-training-credible-fear [https://per 
ma.cc/E4RM-MMBJ]. 
129 S.A.P. Complaint, supra note 18. 
130 Individuals subject to Expedited Removal or who enter at a port-of-entry must demonstrate 
that they have a credible fear, meaning that they have a “significant possibility” of establishing 
eligibility for asylum or protection under the Convention Against Torture. Individuals who 
have a prior order of removal against them or who have certain criminal convictions must 
demonstrate a “reasonable possibility” they would be persecuted on account of a protected 
ground or would be subject to torture. Credible and Reasonable Fear determinations are beyond 
the scope of this Article, but more information can be found from U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, e.g. Questions & Answers: Credible Fear Screenings, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
& IMMGR. SERVS.,  https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/questions-
answers-credible-fear-screening [https://perma.cc/9NWD-LSQD] (last visited Mar. 12, 2020); 
Questions & Answers: Reasonable Fear Screenings, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMGR. SERVS.,  
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/questions-answers-reasonable 
-fear-screenings [https://perma.cc/FYY4-3XL7] (last visited Mar. 12, 2020).  
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including a four-year-old boy who was threatened because his father 
refused to join a political campaign.131 The father was found to have a 
reasonable fear on account of his political opinion.132 Under prior 
precedent, the boy would have satisfied even the most stringent of 
interpretations of asylum law on family-based targeting: the “defining 
family member” was persecuted on account of a protected ground, the family 
relationship was nuclear, and, given his very young age, there were no other 
reasonable explanations for the threats against the boy besides his family 
membership. The case of this plaintiff, and the others included in the suit, 
clearly demonstrates the marked shift in the way that some adjudicators 
are now analyzing protection claims that involve targeting of family 
members. The complaint details how almost all of the plaintiffs were 
subject to negative determinations because the officers found that they had 
not satisfied the social distinction requirement.133 
In contrast, it appears that at least some immigration judges have 
continued to grant cases based on family. For example, an Omaha 
immigration judge granted withholding of removal in a September 2019 case, 
Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 27115, finding that 
the respondent had been persecuted on account of her membership in the 
particular social group of female members of her family.134 Although the 
judge liberally referenced the 2019 L-E-A- opinion in other parts of the 
decision, it is notably absent in the section discussing social distinction. The 
court cited only to Matter of M-E-V-G-, but did seem to be implicitly 
incorporating Barr’s more stringent social distinction test, noting that “the 
[redacted surname] family as a whole is meaningfully distinguished” within 
the society in question because the family was known to be involved in drug 
and human trafficking.135 In another September 2019 case, Center for Gender 
& Refugee Studies Database Case No. 34658, a Baltimore immigration judge 
relied heavily on the positive Fourth Circuit precedent discussed infra, finding 
 
131 S.A.P. Complaint, supra note 18, ¶¶ 18, 19, 24; Press Release, Crowell Moring LLP, 
CLINIC Lawsuit Seeks to Protect Asylum Seekers who Fear Family-Based Harm (Nov. 25, 
2019), https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/PressReleasesAnnouncements/CLINIC-Law 
suit-Seeks-to-Protect-Asylum-Seekers-who-Fear-Family-Based-Harm/pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
M9JQ-WS2M]. 
132 S.A.P. Complaint, supra note 18, ¶ 24. 
133 Id. at ¶¶ 24–35; In fact, representatives from the San Francisco Asylum Office stated in a 
presentation on October 22, 2019 that families effectively have to be “Kennedys” or 
“Kardashians” in order to satisfy the social distinction requirement. San Francisco Asylum 
Office, Presentation to the U.C. Hastings Refugee & Human Rights Clinic (Oct. 22, 2019). 
134 Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 27115, 13 (Immigration J. Dec. 
Sept. 27, 2019). 
135 Id. at 11. 
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the respondent’s proposed particular social groups of “family members of 
[respondent’s uncle]” and “family members of [respondent’s sister]” to be 
cognizable.136 The court cited to L-E-A- as standing for the proposition that 
while family is “not inherently a cognizable particular social group, family 
may still constitute a particular social group . . . .”137 The court then went on to 
accept as sufficient evidence of social distinction the fact that the persecutor 
stated on multiple occasions that he knew the respondent’s entire family and 
that the respondent was from a small community where all of the neighbors 
know each other.138 Given that similar facts are likely to be present in many 
family-based targeting cases, it appears that this judge correctly parsed the 
holding and dicta from Barr’s decision to reject as binding the portion opining 
that most nuclear families will not meet the social distinction requirement.
 At the circuit level, the courts have had mixed reactions to the 
Attorney General’s opinion in L-E-A-. For example, in October 2019, the 
Fifth Circuit characterized the decision quite differently from the USCIS 
guidance, stating that “Matter of L-E-A stands for the proposition that 
families may qualify as social groups, but the decision must be reached on a 
case-by-case basis.”139 The court also “recognize[d] that Matter of L-E-A- is 
at odds with the precedent of several circuits.”140 The Eleventh Circuit in an 
August 2019 case remanded the petitioner’s asylum and withholding of 
removal claims, finding that his relationship to his father-in-law was “one 
central reason, if not the central reason” for his persecution by a Mexican 
cartel.141 Because the petition for review only dealt with nexus and not with 
the cognizability of the particular social group—“his father-in-law’s 
immediate family,” which the Board and the immigration judge had accepted 
prior to the Attorney General’s decision—the Court “express[ed] no view on 
how, if at all, Matter of L-E-A- impacts Mr. Perez-Sanchez’s proposed PSG 
or whether the Attorney General’s decision is entitled to deference.”142 In 
contrast, the Tenth Circuit in a September 2019 decision framed L-E-A- in 
much the same way that USCIS has, emphasizing that nuclear families will 
generally not be socially distinct.143 However, the court declined to reach this 
issue directly, upholding the determination of the immigration judge and the 
 
136 Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 34658, 17 (Immigration J. Dec. 
Sept. 2019). 
137 Id. at 18. 
138 Id. at 18. 
139 Pena Oseguera v. Barr, 936 F.3d 249, 251 (5th Cir. 2019). 
140 Id. at 251. 
141 Perez-Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 935 F.3d 1148, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2019). 
142 Id. at 1158, n.7 (emphasis added). 
143 Saucedo-Miranda v. Barr, 758 Fed. App’x 586 (10th Cir. 2019).  
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Board of Immigration Appeals that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate 
nexus because his family was simply the victim of criminal activity.144 
Adjudicators at all levels are still grappling with Barr’s decision in 
L-E-A-, although it has already done serious damage to prior decades of legal 
precedent recognizing the validity of claims involving family relationships. 
However, as was the case with domestic violence and gang cases following 
A-B-,145 Matter of L-E-A- should not be seen as foreclosing family-based 
asylum. In fact, Barr acknowledged that his “opinion does not bar all family-
based social groups from qualifying for asylum”146 and emphasized that the 
determination must be made on a case-by-case basis.147 Despite USCIS’s 
guidance to the contrary, the holding of L-E-A- is not that particular social 
groups defined by family are categorically impermissible. Instead, it is the 
much narrower holding that the Board’s analysis of the cognizability of the 
respondent’s proposed social group “did not . . . satisfy the Board’s duty to 
ensure that the respondent satisfied the statutory requirements to qualify for 
asylum” and thus that the Board’s conclusion that the particular social group 
was valid should be reversed.148 The remainder of the decision, including 
Barr’s sweeping statements about previous case law, and his new 
interpretation of social distinction, is dicta that need not be followed. 
Furthermore, the Attorney General’s more restrictive positions on family-
based asylum represent a significant departure from prior precedent, 
 
144 Id. at 7.  
145 See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 126 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that the blanket 
rule in Matter of A-B- against domestic violence and gang-related particular social groups 
was impermissible as both arbitrary and capricious with no legal basis and running contrary 
to the individualized analysis required by the INA). 
146 Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- II), 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 595 (Att’y Gen. 2018). He was likely 
motivated to take this position by a District Court Judge’s rebuke of his predecessor in Grace 
v. Whitaker, which challenged Attorney General Sessions’s seemingly categorical rejection 
of domestic violence and gang-related particular social groups in Matter of A-B-. See Grace, 
344 F. Supp. 3d at 126. 
147 L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 591; see also Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (“[T]he BIA may not reject a group solely because it had previously found a 
similar group in a different society to lack social distinction or particularity.”); Matter 
of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 251 (B.I.A. 2014) (“Social group determinations are 
made on a case-by-case basis.”); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 
1985) (“The particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under this 
construction remains ‘to be determined on a case-by-case basis.’”); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMGR. SERVS., PM-02-0162, GUIDANCE FOR PROCESSING REASONABLE FEAR, 
CREDIBLE FEAR, ASYLUM AND REFUGEE CLAIMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MATTER OF A-
B- 3 (2018) (“Officers must analyze each case on its own merits in the context of the 
society where the claim arises.”). 
148 L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 596. 
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making them even less deserving of judicial consideration.149 For all of 
these reasons, it is clear that the Attorney General lacks the authority to 
make a blanket ruling that a specific particular social group is not cognizable, 
leaving room for practitioners to present family-based claims while taking 
additional care to build the record for their individual clients.  
 
E. International and Comparative Views on Family-Based Particular Social 
Groups and Nexus 
 
Having examined the history of particular social groups defined by 
family membership in the United States, this Article now turns to consider the 
same subject beyond our borders. Per the United States Supreme Court, “[i]f one 
thing is clear from the legislative history of the . . . definition of ‘refugee,’ and 
indeed the entire 1980 [Refugee] Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary 
purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 
United Nations Protocol . . . .”150 As such, guidance from the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), while not binding, is considered 
persuasive and “may be a useful interpretive aid.”151 The UNHCR has published 
 
149 In National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 
the Supreme Court held that where Chevron deference was owed to the agency on an 
issue, but a federal court published an opinion on the issue before the agency did, the 
court must defer to the agency’s subsequent published interpretation. 545 U.S. 967, 980 
(2005). However, given the decades of preceding Board case law supporting the 
cognizability of family-based particular social groups, this change could potentially be 
challenged as representing an unreasoned and arbitrary departure from the agency’s 
preceding position that does not merit deference by the courts. See id.. at 1001 (“[T]he 
Commission is free within the limits of reasoned interpretation to change course if it 
adequately justifies the change.”); Smiley v. Citibank (S. Dakota), 517 U.S. 735, 742 
(1996) (indicating that “[s]udden and unexplained change” or “change that does not take 
account of legitimate reliance on prior interpretation” may be arbitrary, capricious, or 
an abuse of discretion not requiring deference); I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 
421, 446 n.30 (1987) (“An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts 
with the agency’s earlier interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than 
a consistently held agency view.”). 
150 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436-37 & n.19 (1987) (citing H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 96-781, 
at 19 (1980)). The United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees in 1968. The 1967 Protocol is effectively identical to the 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, but expands its scope beyond events that occurred in Europe before 
January 1, 1951. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267. The fundamental concept behind both the Convention and the Protocol is the 
principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits countries from returning individuals to return 
to a country where they would be subjected to persecution.  
151 I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999); see also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 
511, 536-37 (2009) (citing the U.N. handbook as a source “to which the Court has looked for 
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multiple guidelines and position papers to aid states parties in assessing 
protection claims. 
The UNHCR has recognized that the family constitutes a cognizable 
particular social group since “[m]embers of a family, whether through blood 
ties or through marriage and attendant kinship ties, meet the requirements of 
the definition by sharing a common characteristic which is innate and 
unchangeable, as well as fundamental and protected.”152 The UNHCR in 
another document called the family “[o]ne of the most visible examples of a 
particular social group” and further provided that nexus can be established 
“for example where family members . . . are targeted for persecution as a 
means of punishing the [“defining family member”] or forcing them to 
surrender or cease their activities.”153 The UNHCR has indicated that family 
membership could be a viable way of analyzing asylum claims based on 
gender-based violence154 as well as gang violence.155 The recognition of 
families as a social group is further reinforced by other sources of 
international law such as the American Convention on Human Rights, to 
which the U.S. is a signatory, which describes the family as “the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society,”156 and the Universal Declaration of 
 
guidance in the past”); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 248 (B.I.A. 2014) 
(confirming that, while not binding on U.S. authorities, the views of the UNHCR “are a useful 
interpretive aid”). 
152 U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, POSITION ON CLAIMS FOR REFUGEE STATUS 
UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES BASED ON A FEAR OF 
PERSECUTION DUE TO AN INDIVIDUAL’S MEMBERSHIP OF A FAMILY OR CLAN ENGAGED IN A 
BLOOD FEUD ¶ 18 (2006), https://www.refworld.org/docid/44201a574.html [https://perma. 
cc/6LEH-JWA4].  
153 U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATION: IDENTIFYING 
WHO IS A REFUGEE, SELF-STUDY MODULE 2, at 37 (2005), https://www.unhcr.org/publi 
cations/legal/43144dc52/self-study-module-2-refugee-status-determination-identifying-
refugee .html [https://perma.cc/A3WQ-YQGF].  
154 See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION: GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 1A(2) OF 
THE 1951 CONVENTION AND/OR ITS 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES ¶ 
33 (2002), https://www.unhcr.org/3d58ddef4.pdf [https://perma.cc/86AM-UV7Z] (explaining 
that women are frequently persecuted because of the political opinions and activities of their 
male relatives, and these family connections must be taken into account when considering 
gender-based claims). 
155 See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDANCE NOTE ON REFUGEE CLAIMS 
RELATING TO VICTIMS OF ORGANIZED GANGS ¶ 40 (2010), https://www.ref 
world.org/pdfid/4bb21fa02.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNT9-XFQV] (explaining that relatives of 
individuals targeted by gang members can be persecuted because of their family ties, and in 
such a case, family membership would constitute a particular social group). 
156 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 17(1), Nov. 
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
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Human Rights, recognizing that “[t]he family is the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society and is entitled to protection by Society and the State.”157 
In addition to considering the viewpoints of international bodies, the 
United States Supreme Court has indicated that the interpretations of other 
treaty signatories should be given considerable weight.158 It is thus instructive 
to examine the jurisprudence of other common law countries159 that have 
considered the grounds for refugee protection on the basis of family. 
 
1. United Kingdom—family is a cognizable particular social group 
and “defining family member” need not establish nexus 
 
The United Kingdom House of Lords160 issued its seminal decision 
around family-based particular social groups in 2006. In Secretary of State 
for the Home Department v. K and Fornah v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department,161 the House of Lords considered two different cases, the first 
of which implicated family-based particular social group membership 
wherein an Iranian woman and her son faced persecution after her husband 
was arrested and detained by the Revolutionary Guards. 
 
157 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 16(3) (Dec. 10, 1948); see 
also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 23(1) (Dec. 19, 1966), S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 UNTS 171 (containing the same language); International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 10(1) (Dec. 16. 1966), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-19; 
993 UNTS 3 (identifying the family as “the natural and fundamental group unit of society”).  
158 See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 16 (2010) (“In interpreting any treaty, the opinions of our 
sister signatories . . . are entitled to considerable weight” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
159 As noted by the UNHCR, “In civil law jurisdictions, the particular social group ground is 
generally less well developed. Most decision-makers place more emphasis on whether or not a risk 
of persecution exists than on the standard for defining a particular social group.” U.N. HIGH COMM’R 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: “MEMBERSHIP OF A 
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP” WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 1A(2) OF THE 1951 CONVENTION 
AND/OR ITS 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES ¶ 8 (2002), https://www. 
unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/3d58de2da/guide lines-international-protection-2-membership-
particular-social-group.html [https://perma.cc/V9KS-XXPQ].  
160 The House of Lords was the United Kingdom’s highest Court of Appeal until 2009, when 
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom was created. See generally HOUSE OF LORDS, 
HOUSE OF LORDS BRIEFING: JUDICIAL WORK (2008), https://www.parliament.uk/documents/ 
lords-information-office/hoflbpjudicial.pdf [https://perma.cc/C496-TV5T]. The judicial work 
was done by twelve Law Lords, who became the first justices of the UK Supreme Court. See 
generally id. When the House of Lords retained jurisdiction over judicial matters, the procedure 
was for each of the Law Lords on the Appellate Committee (usually five Law Lords) to give 
their opinions in the order of seniority. See generally id.  
161 Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. K [2006] UKHL 46, [2007] 1 AC 412 (HL) (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (UK). 
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The Law Lords were unequivocal that a family can constitute a particular 
social group. Lord Bingham of Cornhill noted that the Secretary of State (the 
party opposing the appellant’s claim) accepted that family could be a particular 
social group and stated that this “reflects a consensus very clearly established by 
earlier domestic authority . . . and also by international authority. The consensus 
is clearly reflected in the academic literature.”162 Both Lord Hope of 
Craighead163 and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry concurred, with the latter stating, “it 
is obvious that a family can constitute a ‘particular social group’. Indeed, the 
family could well be regarded as the archetypal social group.”164  
Having established that family is a cognizable particular social group, 
the Committee focused more on the question of whether the “defining family 
member” must have been persecuted on account of a protected ground. The 
Lords considered two 1997 Court of Appeal cases that reached opposite 
conclusions on the question,165 and determined that the Refugee Convention 
“directs attention to the position of the asylum-seeker, not to that of any other 
person with whom he or she may be associated. It is his or her fear of persecution 
for a Convention reason, not someone else’s fear, that is in issue.”166 Lord Hope 
emphasized that to require nexus to a protected ground for the “defining family 
member” would impermissibly require more of family-based claims than of 
others.167 He wrote that what is critical is the connection between the protected 
ground and the persecution but that clearly, “it is not necessary to show that 
everyone else of the same race, for example, or every other member of the 
 
162 Id. at [19] (citing to Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Savchenkov [1996] Imm AR 
28, [1995] EWCA Civ 47 (UK); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. 
Sarrazola [2001] FCA 263  28–34 (Austl.); Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th 
Cir. 2005); JAMES HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 164–66 (1st ed. 1991); GUY 
GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 361 (2d ed. 1996)). 
163 Id. at [45] (citing to U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, POSITION ON CLAIMS FOR 
REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 
BASED ON A FEAR OF PERSECUTION DUE TO AN INDIVIDUAL’S MEMBERSHIP OF A FAMILY OR 
CLAN ENGAGED IN A BLOOD FEUD 5 (2006), https://www.refworld.org/docid/44201 
a574.html [https://perma.cc/6LEH-JWA4]; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, supra note 157, art. 23(1). 
164 Id. at [61]. 
165 Compare Quijano v. Sec’y of State for the Home Department [1996] EWCA Civ 1244 (U.K.) 
(“[T]he fact that the stepfather was not entitled to claim asylum demonstrated that the family 
was not a social group liable to persecution because it was a particular social group.”), with R v. 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte De Melo, [1997] Imm. AR 43, 49 (U.K.) (“The original 
evil which gives rise to persecution against an individual is one thing; if it is then transferred so 
that a family is persecuted, on the face of it that will come within the Convention.”). 
166 Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. K and Fornah v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 
[2006] UKHL 46 at [48]. 
167 Id. at [47]. 
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particular social group, is subject to the same threat.”168 Lord Rodger pointed 
out that to require animus against the family itself would render family-based 
claims virtually impossible to win.169 Lord Bingham reiterated the doctrine of 
mixed motives, noting “[t]he ground on which the claimant relies need not be 
the only or even the primary reason for the apprehended persecution. It is 
enough that the ground relied on is an effective reason.”170 
This unanimous decision by the five Law Lords established binding 
precedent in the United Kingdom that the “defining family member” need not 
have been persecuted on account of a protected ground, laying the 
groundwork for subsequent decisions to this effect in lower courts, as well as 
other jurisdictions that have cited approvingly to the case. Furthermore, the 
U.K. jurisprudence seems much less focused on whether a persecutor’s 
motives in family-based cases can be instead characterized as based on 
personal or criminal reasons. For example, a judge from the Upper Tribunal, 
Immigration and Asylum Chamber considered a case in 2012 involving an 
Albanian blood feud but made no indication that the persecutor’s motivations 
may not have been connected to a protected ground,171 a stark contrast to the 
Department of Homeland Security’s 2019 brief in L-E-A- that specifically 
identified blood feuds as failing to meet the standard for nexus because they are 
“based on personal disputes and involve criminal acts of personal retribution.”172  
 
2. New Zealand—family is a cognizable particular social group and 
“defining family member” need not establish nexus 
 
The New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority173 has explicitly 
cited to and adopted the reasoning in Secretary of State for the Home 
 
168 Id.  
169 Id. at [64]. 
170 Id. at [17]. 
171 See EH  v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2012] UKUT 00348 (IAC) [61]-[62] (U.K.) 
(citing to Secretary of State for the Home Department v. K and Fornah v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department and noting “[i]t is settled therefore, that members of families or 
clans are capable of constituting a particular social group and that the Refugee Convention 
would be engaged where there existed a reasonable degree of likelihood that members of a 
particular family would be at risk of serious harm on return . . . .”); see also AN and NN  v. 
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2007] UKAIT 97 [21] (U.K.) (discussing whether an 
actual risk of harm existed while noting that the existence of a blood feud affecting the 
petitioners’ family was uncontested).  
172 DHS 2019 Brief, supra note 105, at 29. 
173 The New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority was established in 1991 to adjudicate 
appeals from the Refugee Status Branch of the New Zealand Immigration Service. The 
Authority was replaced by the Immigration and Protection Tribunal in 2010. New Zealand: 
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Department v K and Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department.174 
In a 2010 case, the Colombian appellant had been threatened by paramilitary 
groups for refusing to alter land records for them and had fled with her husband 
and son, who also applied for protection. In defining the term “particular social 
group,” the Authority embraced the “fundamental or immutable” test initially set 
out by the United States in Acosta but notably made no mention of the 
particularity or social distinction requirements added later.175 The Authority 
found “uncontroversial” the proposition that membership of a family can 
constitute a particular social group, citing to a number of preceding New 
Zealander cases as well as case law from the United Kingdom, Australia, the 
United States, and international law secondary sources.176 On the issue of nexus, 
the Authority held, “although it is clear that the primary family member (the 
wife) does not face a risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason, the sole 
reason for the risk faced by the husband and the child is their membership of the 
wife’s family.”177 The Authority granted Convention protection to the husband 
and child and, in contrast to much of the U.S. jurisprudence, did not see fit to 
even discuss whether the reason for the persecution was family-based targeting 
or a generalized criminal intent on the part of the paramilitary. 
The Immigration and Protection Tribunal of New Zealand continues to 
apply this same reasoning in cases involving family-based persecution to date. 
For example, in 2012, the Tribunal considered the case of a South African man 
and his family who had been threatened by a criminal group because of the man’s 
successful business.178 The Tribunal found that the man was not eligible for 
protection because he did not face persecution on account of a Convention 
ground but “for reasons of crime.”179 The Tribunal noted “it can also be said of 
 
Immigration and Protection Tribunal, REFWORLD, https://www.refworld.org/publisher/NZ-
IPT.html [https://perma.cc/Y9DH-V4B9] (last updated Mar. 27, 2020, 5:14 PM). 
174 Refugee Appeal Nos 76485, 76486, 76487 [2010] NZRSAA 71 at [81]-[83] (N.Z.) New 
Zealand is not the only foreign jurisdiction that followed the UK House of Lord’s decision 
in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. K and Fornah v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department. The High Court of Ireland has also done the same. See, e.g., AVB v. 
Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2015] IEHC 13 [27] (Ir.) (“It seems to me that the tribunal 
member fell into error of law in finding that feuds among family members did not have a 
convention nexus . . . .”) . 
175 Id. at [97]. 
176 Id. at [79]-[80] (citing Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Savchenkov [1995] EWCA 
Civ 47 (U.K.); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola [2001] FCA 
263  ¶¶  28-34 (Austl.); Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th Cir. 2005); JAMES 
HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 164-66 (1st ed. 1991); GUY GOODWIN-
GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 361 (2d ed. 1996), among other sources). 
177 Id. [83]. 
178 AK (South Africa) [2012] NZIPT 800174-176 (N.Z.). 
179 Id. at [66].  
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the mother and daughter that they, too, are at risk because of crime” but 
ultimately concluded, “[t]hey are also at risk, however, for another reason . . . 
because they are members of the father’s family.”180 As in this case, New 
Zealand adjudicators as a whole appear to be more willing than their counterparts 
in the U.S. to extend protection to applicants even when the persecutors acted in 
part out of non-Convention grounds181 and give no consideration to whether the 
“defining family member” can demonstrate nexus.182 
 
3. Australia—family is a cognizable particular social group but 
“defining family member” must demonstrate nexus 
 
The Federal Court of Australia183 in 2000 considered the case of a 
husband and wife from Colombia in Sarrazola v Minister for Immigration 
and Multicultural Affairs (No 3).184 After the wife’s brother was killed by a 
criminal group for failing to pay a debt, members of the same group 
demanded that she pay the money or they would kill her children.185 The 
applicant asserted a fear of persecution based on her family membership. The 
Federal Court found “no obstacle to viewing the usual family as a ‘particular 
social group,’”186 and held that the “defining family member” need not have 
been persecuted on account of a protected ground.187  
 
180 Id. at [67]. 
181 See, e.g., AC (Colombia) [2012] NZIPT 800279 at [50] (N.Z.) (finding the appellant 
eligible for protection because a “contributing reason” he was at risk was his relationship to 
his older brother who had been killed by gangs even though he was “substantially” targeted 
for recruitment); see also FK (Sri Lanka) [2019] NZIPT 801383 at [69] (N.Z.) (citing to a 
Refugee Status Appeals Authority decision holding that protection was warranted since, as long 
as family membership is a contributing cause, “It is not necessary for that cause to be the sole 
cause, main cause, direct cause, indirect cause or ‘but for’ cause. It is enough that a Convention 
ground can be identified as being relevant to the cause of the risk of being persecuted”). 
182 See, e.g., CM (Bangladesh) [2019] NZIPT 801411 at [91, 93] (N.Z.) (finding that the 
appellant, a successful businessman in a dispute with former colleagues, had not 
demonstrated nexus but that his wife was entitled to protection on account of her membership 
in the particular social group consisting of her husband’s family members). 
183 The Federal Court of Australia has appellate jurisdiction from the Federal Circuit Court 
of Australia, which in turn reviews decisions made by the Minister for Immigration and 
Border Protection and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The Court’s Jurisdiction, FED. 
CT. OF AUSTL. https://www.fedcourt.gov.au/about/jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/9GP2-67 
22] (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). 
184 Sarrazola v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [No. 3] [2000] FCA 919 
(Austl.).  
185 Id. ¶¶ 5–8. 
186 Id. ¶ 33. 
187 Id. ¶ 36. 
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However, reacting to this decision,188 the Australian Parliament in 
2001 passed the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 6), adding 
subsection 91S, which states that persecution must be disregarded if the 
“defining family member” was not persecuted on account of a Convention 
reason.189 The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs explained, 
“[t]he convention was not designed to protect people who fear persecution 
for personal reasons that have little or nothing to do with the convention - for 
example, because they have failed to pay their family’s debts.”190 This 
legislation was introduced and first read on August 28, 2001 in the midst of the 
so-called Tampa crisis, during which the Australian government refused to 
grant permission to a boat carrying 433 rescued refugees to enter its waters.191 
In applying Section 91S, the Australian Courts have since denied 
family-based asylum cases where the “defining family member” was not 
persecuted on account of a protected ground. Given this requirement, 
Australian adjudicators often need not even reach the issue of whether the 
applicant’s persecution was motivated by the family relationship versus 
personal reasons or generalized criminal intent. Illustrating how 91S operates 
in practice, in 2006, the High Court of Australia192 considered the case of an 
Albanian appellant who feared persecution due to a blood feud deriving from 
when his grandfather killed a member of another family. The Court dismissed 
the appeal, holding that, “it is clear that the grandfather had a fear of persecution 
 
188 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 6) 2001 
indicated that the amendment was aimed at addressing the Sarrazola holding to prevent its 
future application. STCB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs [2006] HCA 61, ¶ 17 (Austl.). 
189 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) 91S (Austl.). 
190 STCB, [2006] HCA ¶ 18 (quoting the Second Reading Speech of the Minister for 
Immigration and Cultural Affairs). 
191 The Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 6) was first introduced and read in the 
House of Representatives on August 28, 2001 and was assented to on September 27, 2001. 
Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 6) 2001 (Cth) (Austl.). https://parlinfo.aph. 
gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbillhome%2F
r1391%22 [https://perma.cc/H6KW-MLQK]. The bill was passed on September 26, along 
with a number of other of bills significantly curtailing the rights of migrants seeking asylum, 
collectively known as the “Pacific Solution.” Parliament of Australia, Border Protection: A New 
Regime, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Former_Commit 
tees/maritimeincident/report/c01 [https://perma.cc/RVW2-GK9Y]. Among other things, the 
Pacific Solution allowed for asylum-seekers to be processed offshore in places like Nauru and 
Papua New Guinea. See, e.g., Refugee Council of Australia, OFFSHORE PROCESSING, 
https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/offshore-processing/ [https://perma.cc/JPT4-R8RJ] (last 
visited July 17, 2019). 
192 The High Court of Australia is the final court of appeal and has broad authority to exercise both 
original and appellate jurisdiction. About the AAT, AUSTL: ADMIN. APPEALS TRIBUNAL, 
https://www.aat.gov.au/about-the-aat [https://perma.cc/4YC5-A4N6] (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). 
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for a reason other than those mentioned in . . . the Convention––revenge for 
murder. Section 91S(a) requires that fear of persecution [as to the appellant] to 
be disregarded.”193 The Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia194 adjudicated a 
similar case in 2013, finding the family-based particular social group to be 
cognizable and stating that “the essential and significant reason for the well-
founded fear of persecution is the applicant’s membership of this particular 
social group.”195 However, in light of section 91S, since the “defining family 
member” was targeted for “revenge . . . purely criminal in motive, not for any 
Convention reason,”196 the applicant was not eligible for protection.  
  
4. Canada—family is a cognizable particular social group but 
“defining family member” must demonstrate nexus 
 
Canadian law has also settled in the same place as Australia, albeit 
without legislative action. It is well-accepted in Canada that family, not 
limited to just nuclear families, can constitute a particular social group.197 
However, despite an earlier line of cases indicating that the “defining family 
member” need not have been persecuted on account of a protected ground,198 
more recent jurisprudence in Canada has fallen squarely into the opposite camp. 
 
193 TCB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] 
HCA 61, ¶ 24 (Austl.).  
194 The Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia provided final review of decisions by officers 
of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship denying protection visas to non-citizens. 
In 2015, the Tribunal was amalgamated into the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which 
provides merits review of a wide range of administrative decisions. Its decisions are subject 
to review by the Federal Court of Australia and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. 
195 1217750 [2013] RTTA ¶ 82, ¶ 78 (Austl.). 
196 Id. ¶ 80. 
197 See, e.g., Estrada v. Canada (Ministry of Citizenship & Immigration), [2015] F.C. 1019, 
para. 8 (Can.) (“[M]embership in a family may take the place of membership in 
a particular social group for the purposes of a refugee claim.”); Hercules Santos v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2011] F.C. 644, para. 23 (Can.) (accepting the 
applicant’s extended family as a particular social group); Ndegwa v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship & Immigration), [2006] F.C. 847, para. 9 (Can.) (“That the family is a valid 
social group for the purposes of seeking refugee protection is well established.”); Serrano v. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] F.C.J. 570, para. 30 (Can.) (“It is 
common ground that a family may be a ‘particular social group.’”). 
198 See, e.g., Rojas v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1995] F.C.J.  296, 
para. 2 (Can.) (stating that family membership is “a ground of persecution which stands on 
its own and need not be related to another of the grounds recognized by the Convention”); 
see also Hristova v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 
132, para. 31 (Can.) (“It would seem that immediate family can be seen to fit within the 
definition of ‘particular social group.’”); Al-Busaidy v. Canada (Minister of Employment & 
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In 2000, the Federal Court of Canada – Appeal Division199 heard the 
case of a Ukrainian businessman who reported government corruption. After 
the entire family received threats and suffered retaliation, his son applied for 
protection based on membership in the particular social group of their 
family.200 The court of first instance, the Immigration and Refugee Board, 
found that because the businessman had not been persecuted on account of a 
protected ground, his son did not meet the requirements for refugee 
status.201 On appeal, the Trial Division upheld the Board’s decision “in 
concluding that when the primary victim of persecution does not come 
within the Convention refugee definition, any derivative Convention 
refugee claim based on family group cannot be sustained. Otherwise, the 
anomaly of derivative claims being allowed but primary claims being 
denied could result.”202 The Federal Court declined to rule on this issue 
since it decided the case on other grounds.203 
There is a growing consensus among Canadian adjudicators204 around 
the principle that it would be an impermissible anomaly for the “defining 
 
Immigration), [1992] F.C.J. 26, para. 3 (Can.) (“Accordingly the [Refugee] Board has 
committed reviewable error in not giving due effect to the applicant’s uncontradicted 
evidence with respect to his membership in a particular social group, namely, his own 
immediate family.” (internal footnote omitted)); cf. Velasquez v. Canada (Minister of 
Employment & Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. 4777, para. 5 (Can.) (declining to return an 
applicant who had not suffered persecution to her home country because her husband 
undisputedly had suffered persecution). 
199 From 1971 to 2003, the Federal Court of Canada consisted of the Trial division and the Appeal 
Division. In 2003, the Trial Division continued on as the Federal Court and the Appeal Division 
became the Federal Court of Appeals. History, FED. CT.| COUR FÉDÉRALE, https://www.fct-cf. 
gc.ca/en/pages/about-the-court/history [ttps://perma.cc/8MWG-GHH6] (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). 
200 Klinko v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2000] 3 F.C. 327, paras. 6–7 (Can.). 
201 Id. at para. 12. 
202 Id at para. 16. 
203 Id. at para. 38. 
204 See, e.g., X, Re, [2018] R.A.D.D. No. 293, ¶ 23 (Can.) (“[W]hen the primary victim 
does not come within the definition of ‘Convention refugee,’ any derivative claims based 
on family group cannot be sustained.”); Acevedo Beza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
& Immigration), [2006] F.C. 478, para. 32 (Can.) (“Because [the applicants] did not prove 
that . . . the principal claimant before the Board . . . met the definition of Convention 
refugee, their related application cannot be granted, since there is no nexus with the 
persecution grounds.”); Serrano v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] 
F.C.J. 570, para. 42 166 (Can.) (“I do not accept that family connection is an attribute 
requiring Convention protection, in the absence of an underlying Convention ground for the 
claimed persecution.”). Canadian applicants have met with much more success when they 
can demonstrate that the “defining family member” was persecuted on account of a protected 
ground. See, e.g., Hercules Santos v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 
[2011] F.C. 644, para. 33 (Can.) (finding reviewable error where the defining family member 
had been persecuted on account of her political opinion). 
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family member” not to be eligible while his family members are afforded 
protection.205 For example, in 2002, the Trial Division ruled that a 
Guatemalan applicant who had been kidnapped to extort a ransom from her 
parents, who were successful restaurant owners, had not been persecuted on 
account of a Convention ground and was thus not eligible for protection.206 
The Judge concluded,  
This . . . also avoids the anomaly that Ms. Gonzalez’s parents, 
as the victims of crime, cannot claim the protection of the 
Convention, but Ms. Gonzalez could, solely because of the 
relationship with her parents. It avoids the further anomaly 
that Ms. Gonzalez cannot claim status as a Convention refugee 
on the basis of her ordeal as a kidnap victim, but could do so 
as the daughter of the recipient of the ransom demand.207  
As one Federal Court Judge observed in a 2015 decision, “The family, 
as a group, must therefore be subjected to retaliation and revenge to hope to 
be granted the protection of Canada.”208 However, this position may be 
somewhat mitigated by the fact that the Canadian courts apply a less 
restrictive standard for nexus in requiring that the Convention ground be a 
reason, but not necessarily the central or sole reason, for the persecution.209 
 
II. FAMILY-BASED PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP  
MEMBERSHIP IN PRACTICE 
 
The second half of this Article transitions from describing the existing 
state of the law to surfacing the lessons it yields for practitioners handling family-
based cases going forward. Given Barr’s recent ruling in Matter of L-E-A- 
challenging social group cognizability and the Board’s previous denial of the 
 
205 It is not clear from the case law why the “defining family member” not being eligible for 
protection should justify barring their family members from protection. If so troubled by this 
“anomaly,” it would be equally defensible for the Court to consider whether there are 
grounds for extending protection to the “defining family member,” rather than taking it away 
from applicants who otherwise meet the Refugee definition. 
206 Gonzalez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] F.C.J. 456, 
paras. 3, 15 (Can.). 
207 Id. at para. 17.  
208 Estrada v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2015] F.C. 1019, para. 10 (Can.). 
209 See, e.g., Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. B344, [2013] F.C. 447, 
para. 40 (Can.) (“[I]f at least one of the motives can be related to a Convention ground, nexus 
may be established.”); Shahiraj v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 
F.C.J. No. 734, para. 20 (Can.) (finding nexus where the applicant was targeted “based at 
least partially on his own association with his brother”); Zhu v. Canada (Minister of 
Employment & Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. 80, para. 2 (Can.) (“[I]t is enough for the 
existence of political motivation that one of the motives was political.”). 
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case based on nexus, it is all the more important that asylum applicants submit 
detailed evidence as well as explicit arguments as to how they meet both of these 
requirements.210 Furthermore, as noted in the Introduction, in light of the Board’s 
2018 ruling that applicants must delineate all particular social group formulations 
before the Immigration Judge or lose them on appeal,211 practitioners should 
consider and assert all possible viable legal theories for their clients. 
A family-based particular social group may be possible under a diverse 
set of circumstances. One category particularly germane in the present day is 
cases involving gang violence. Many of the recent asylum seekers fleeing 
Central America and Mexico report that they left their countries to escape gangs 
and other organized criminal groups.212 While a family-based theory of 
targeting will of course not apply to all cases, it may be feasible in many given 
that members of armed groups frequently target family members of individuals 
who oppose them.213 This opposition may take many forms including resisting 
extortion,214 testifying as a witness to crimes committed by gangs,215 
threatening to report or in fact reporting criminal activity,216 turning down 
attempts at recruitment,217 rejecting sexual advances,218 being a member of a 
rival gang,219 or defecting from a gang.220  Although the person who engages in 
 
210 This Article focuses on cognizability and nexus for particular social group claims. The 
other statutory requirements for a grant of asylum are outside the scope of this article, but 
of course should also be carefully analyzed and supported by evidence. 
211 Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (B.I.A. 2018).  
212 See, e.g., Robbie Whelan, Why Are People Fleeing Central America? A New Breed of 
Gangs is Taking Over, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pay-or-
die-extortion-economy-drives-latin-americas-murder-crisis-1541167619 
[https://perma.cc/Z9HZ-7EUK] (discussing how gang violence is driving migration away 
from Central America).  
213 U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDANCE NOTE ON REFUGEE CLAIMS 
RELATING TO VICTIMS OF ORGANIZED GANGS, supra note 155, at ¶¶ 17, 40. 
214 See generally Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2018); Zavaleta-
Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2017); Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9 
(1st Cir. 2014), as amended (Aug. 8, 2014); Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 
40, 41 (B.I.A. 2017). 
215 See, e.g., Rivas v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 537 (8th Cir. 2018); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 
632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011). 
216 See, e.g., Cruz v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 122 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (Mar. 14, 2017); 
Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2015); Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944 
(4th Cir. 2015). 
217 See, e.g., Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d 944; Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 
2014); Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2012); Bonilla-Morales v. Holder, 
607 F.3d 1132 (6th Cir. 2010). 
218 See, e.g., Gonzalez Ruano v. Barr, 922 F.3d 346, 349-50, 357 (7th Cir. 2019). 
219 See, e.g., Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2015); Cordova, 759 F.3d 332. 
220 See, e.g., W.G.A. v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Oct. 22, 2018).  
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these activities may be found not to satisfy nexus to a protected ground,221 their 
family members may have winning claims, especially with the submission of 
strong evidence and a clearly-articulated legal theory. 
Family-based particular social groups could also be workable in cases 
involving intrafamilial violence. In 2001, the Ninth Circuit in Aguirre-
Cervantes v. INS considered the case of a young Mexican woman who had 
suffered extreme abuse by her father, who also beat her siblings and her 
mother.222 The Court held the petitioner had been persecuted on account of 
her membership in the particular social group consisting of her immediate 
family because, “Mr. Aguirre’s goal was to dominate and persecute members 
of his immediate family . . . . There is no evidence that he ever acted violently 
toward any non-family member . . . . It was established by abundant 
evidence––and undisputed––that it was the petitioner’s status as a member of 
that family that prompted her beatings.”223  
Similarly, a Philadelphia immigration judge issued a grant of asylum 
in 2018 to a Mexican woman and her children who had experienced years of 
abuse from the woman’s husband. The judge found the particular social group 
of “immediate family members of [name of husband]” to be cognizable224 
and concluded that although the persecutor may have held mixed motives, 
 
221 See, e.g., Matter of S-E-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 589-90 (B.I.A. 2008) (holding that gang 
recruitment resisters do not constitute a particular social group); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & 
N. Dec. 91, 593-94 (B.I.A. 2008) (same); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 221-23 
(B.I.A. 2014) (finding that former gang members do not constitute a particular social group). 
However, some of these characteristics have been found by certain courts to be cognizable 
particular social groups. For example, claims involving witnesses, persons who testify 
against gang members, and persons who assist law enforcement have met with some success. 
See, e.g., Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013); Madrigal v. 
Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that a former military official who 
participated in anti-drug enforcement might have a meritorious particular social group 
claim); Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 504 (3d Cir. 2011), as amended (2012) (finding 
“a ‘common, immutable characteristic’ with other civilian witnesses who have the ‘shared 
past experience’ of assisting law enforcement against violent gangs”). But see In re C-A-, 23 
I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006) (finding that government informants, unlike public 
witnesses, do not constitute a particular social group for purposes of designation as refugees). 
Though beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that applications in these 
categories have been granted, especially with the submission of a robust record. The Center 
for Gender & Refugee Studies, for example, has tracked outcomes and does have grants in 
many of these areas. See Technical Assistance and Training, supra note 20. 
222 Aguirre-Cervantes v. I.N.S., 242 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2001), reh’g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated, 270 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2001), withdrawn from bound volume, and opinion 
vacated on reh’g en banc, 273 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2001). The decision was vacated and 
superseded because the persecutor in the case, the petitioner’s father, died. 
223 Id. at 1178.  
224 Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 17509, 12 (Immigration J. 
Dec. Oct. 11, 2018). 
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one central reason for his actions was to dominate and control the immediate 
family members whom he saw as property.225 The court went on to point out 
that the persecutor would not have harmed his wife and children “were one 
to remove the characteristic of ‘kinship tie’ from the equation,” and that this 
was clear evidence that family membership was central to the persecution.226 
These cases notwithstanding, fact patterns involving intrafamilial 
violence may be especially prone to the conclusion that the persecutor was 
not motivated by the victim’s social group membership. In fact, the 
Department of Homeland Security commented on this very matter in its 2016 
brief, indicating that intrafamilial harm will often be for “purely personal 
reasons,” but acknowledging as well that all cases must be assessed on their 
individual record.227 By 2019, the Department had taken a harder line, 
dismissing domestic violence cases as unlikely to satisfy the requirements for 
persecution on account of family membership.228  
 
A. Arguing Cognizability of a Family-Based Particular Social Group 
 
As presented in the first half of this Article, the majority of 
adjudicators––with Attorney General Barr in the distinct minority229––have 
accepted the cognizability of family-based particular social groups when they 
involve nuclear family members.230 As such, when possible, respondents 
should articulate their social groups as “immediate/nuclear members of the 
[surname] family” or “immediate/nuclear family members of [name of 
defining family member].”  
As an illustration of the importance of how social groups are 
formulated: the Board considered a case in June 2017 in which the 
respondent defined his particular social group as “nuclear family members 
of X, his father and a leader of a local MS-13 clique.”231 The Board found 
this formulation lacked social distinction, focusing on the additional terms 
appended to the core “nuclear family members of X.”232 The Board stated 
that the group was not socially distinct because there was insufficient 
 
225 Id.  
226 Id. 
227 DHS 2016 Brief, supra note 66, at 17 n.10. 
228 See DHS 2019 Brief, supra note 105, at 1 (“[A]n abusive spouse inflicts harm on his or 
her spouse because of their personal relationship, but that fact alone does not suffice to 
demonstrate nexus between the harm and membership in their family unit.”). 
229 See Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- II), 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 494 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (noting that 
some nuclear families are socially distinct and can be considered “particular social groups”).  
230 See supra Section I. 
231 Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 16808 1 (B.I.A. June 16, 2017).  
232 Id. at 2. 
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evidence to show that children or family members of gang leaders are 
viewed or treated distinctly in Honduran society.233 The Board failed to 
appreciate that the phrase “the leader of a local MS-13 clique,”234 is merely 
a descriptor of individual X and thus does not substantively alter the 
formulation of the group. Had the respondent described his social group 
simply as “nuclear family members of X,” it seems like there may have 
been a different outcome––or at least a substantially different analysis. 
Further elucidating the importance of carefully delineating the particular 
social group, the Department of Homeland Security, in its 2019 brief in L-
E-A-, argued  the particular social group of the respondent’s family should 
be rejected because it lacked particularity.235 It seems evident that the 
respondent meant “nuclear family” given that the “defining family 
member” was his father, but the Department appeared to be willfully ignoring 
this and considered only the more general group of “his family” because the 
respondent did not explicitly say otherwise.236 In light of these cases and 
others, practitioners should avoid overcomplicating their social groups by 
including additional terms and characteristics, but also should take care to 
specify “nuclear family” or “immediate family” where appropriate. 
Attorney General Barr has asserted that the family should generally not 
be recognized as a cognizable social group, but it is well-established that social 
groups must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.237 Rather than assuming that 
any given formulation will automatically succeed (or fail) on cognizability, 
practitioners should make explicit arguments and submit evidence238 to this 
effect.239 It will be even more important to do this when presenting a social group 
that extends beyond the bounds of immediate family membership in light of the 
significant disagreement among adjudicators as to the cognizability of extended 
family-defined groups. In these cases, practitioners should consider asserting 
multiple alternative formulations of social groups, forcing the immigration judge 
to separately analyze their merits and to preserve them on appeal. The following 
Subsections present arguments that can be made along with types of evidence to 
support them to demonstrate that family-based particular social groups meet the 
requirements for cognizability. 
 
 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 1. 
235 DHS 2019 Brief, supra note 105, at 38. 
236 Id. 
237 Compare L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, with supra notes 112, 147 and accompanying text. 
238 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 244 (B.I.A. 2014) (listing “country conditions 
reports, expert witness testimony, and press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, 
historical animosities and the like” as relevant to establishing a social group). 
239 But see supra note 21 (arguing that the Board should return to solely using the Acosta standard). 
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1. Acosta – fundamental or immutable 
 
The first requirement for particular social groups to be found cognizable 
is that characteristics of the group be either fundamental or immutable, as set out 
in Matter of Acosta.240 This test is relatively easy for family-based groups to 
satisfy, and even Attorney General Barr conceded that “many family 
relationships will be immutable” in L-E-A-.241 Family membership is an 
immutable characteristic because people generally cannot change the family 
to which they belong. Children will always have their same parents. Brothers 
and sisters will always be siblings. Eccentric aunts, uncles, and cousins can 
be avoided at family gatherings but not entirely denied. Family also falls into 
the “fundamental” category envisioned by Acosta. Even in cases where 
family membership could arguably be changed, such as joining another 
family by marriage, as described in the Department’s 2016 brief in L-E-A-, 
[E]ven where it may be possible to leave an immediate family 
group in such a way that one can no longer be considered to 
have the trait, this type of family relationship is generally 
fundamental to an individual’s identity, and is not a change 
that one should be required to make.242  
Family bonds, whether immediate or extended, are so intrinsic to an 
individual’s identity that they should not have to be severed or hidden. 
 
2. Particularity 
 
In order to be found cognizable, particular social groups must also 
be defined with particularity. Nuclear families satisfy this requirement 
because they have clear, definable boundaries comprised of a person’s 
parents, spouse, siblings, and children.243 Oftentimes, it is clear who is a 
member of a nuclear family because they share a surname and may 
cohabitate. Even when individuals in a family have different surnames––
for example, when a wife and husband do not share a surname or where a 
daughter has taken on a new surname and moved into another home after 
marriage––persecutors and members of a given community may still 
identify them as part of the same family. Most adjudicators, including the 
 
240 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
241 L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 593. 
242 DHS 2016 Brief, supra note 66, at 7-8; see also Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 
(identifying kinship as an innate characteristic that satisfies the immutable requirement). 
243 In fact, this position was taken by the Department of Homeland Security in its 2016 brief. 
The Department cited to the Merriam-Webster definition of “immediate family” as support. 
DHS 2016 Brief, supra note 66, at 1 n.1. 
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Attorney General in L-E-A-,244 accept that nuclear families can satisfy the 
particularity requirement. 
Some adjudicators, however, have rejected family-based social 
groups as lacking sufficient particularity where the family relationship was 
more attenuated. In Matter of S-E-G-, the Board found that “[t]he proposed 
group of ‘family members,’ which could include fathers, mothers, siblings, 
uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews, grandparents, cousins, and others, is also too 
amorphous a category.”245 This is not to say, however, that no social group 
that includes extended families can be particular.246 The Fourth Circuit in 
Crespin-Valladares v. Holder found cognizable the social group “family 
members of those who actively oppose gangs in El Salvador by agreeing to 
be prosecutorial witnesses” where the petitioner’s uncle was the “defining 
family member.”247 The court stated, “[t]he family unit—centered here 
around the relationship between an uncle and his nephew—possesses 
boundaries that are at least as ‘particular and well-defined’ as other groups 
whose members have qualified for asylum.”248 In a 2018 decision, the 
Seventh Circuit seemed to accept that the petitioner was part of a cognizable 
social group consisting of his family where the “defining family member” 
was his cousin.249 The Ninth Circuit has also indicated that it might find 
particular social groups involving extended family members cognizable.250  
In order to satisfy the particularity requirement, practitioners may cite 
to positive case law but should also create an individual record clearly 
demonstrating that the proposed social group has definable boundaries. A 
social group such as family of X person or members of the X family could 
encompass extended family members so long as the evidence supports that, 
within the given community or society, this group is sufficiently particular. 
 
244 See L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 593-94 (citing other cases to point out that an extended 
family definition might be “too vague” to be particular before continuing to argue that even 
clearly defined family groups must also be socially distinct). 
245 In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585 (B.I.A. 2008); see also Center for Gender & 
Refugee Studies Database Case No. 20641, 17 (Immigration J. Dec. May 2018) (finding that 
that the particular social group of “[name] family” lacked particularity because “there are a 
large number of individuals who may qualify as a member of this family”); 
246 See supra Subsection I.C.1 (describing how the BIA has found particular social groups 
that include extended family members cognizable following L-E-A-). 
247 Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 120-21 (4th Cir. 2011). 
248 Id. at 125; see also Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 338, 340 (4th Cir. 2014) (remanding 
a case to the BIA to consider whether the petitioner’s kinship ties to his uncle and cousin 
constituted a cognizable social group). 
249 See Plaza-Ramirez v. Sessions, 908 F.3d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 2018) (denying petition for 
review on other grounds, nonetheless).  
250 Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015) (remanding for consideration of a 
particular social group that included the petitioner’s cousin). 
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As an illustration, the Refugee & Human Rights Clinic had a client who was 
from a small village in El Salvador. Multiple members of his family had been 
killed or threatened by gangs, including uncles, aunts, and cousins.251 We 
argued that, in the context of the community in question, the extended family 
constituted a discrete family unit with definable boundaries that could satisfy 
the particularity requirement. We included as evidence statements from the 
applicant and his family members such as, “[f]amilies in our village and 
nearby villages know one another. Because there are only about 200 houses 
in village, we mostly know who everybody is,”252 and “[m]y family and I are 
well-known within our village and the neighboring village. Because our village 
is small, and because my family has lived there for a long time, most people 
know and can easily recognize my family.”253 Alongside these types of 
statements, we also submitted country conditions documentation demonstrating 
that the concept of family is broader than just nuclear family in El Salvador. For 
example, the Family Code obligates grandparents, siblings, uncles and aunts, 
and first cousins to provide for minors in their families.254 
 
3. Social distinction 
 
The final requirement for cognizability is social distinction. There is 
ample evidence demonstrating that families are viewed as distinct in most 
societies. Many countries have laws, policies, and customs that recognize 
family units.255 In fact, the very existence of family-based immigration in the 
 
251 Declaration of X, represented by the UC Hastings Refugee & Human Rights Clinic, 
granted asylum Apr. 14, 2017. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 See Código de Familia, Decreto No. 677, Book 4, Title II, Ch. 2, § 1, art. 287 (Oct. 11, 
1993), http://www.oas.org/dil/esp/Codigo_de_Familia_El_Salvador.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6LHU-SK9D] (allowing a judge to name as a child’s guardian the child’s grandparents, 
siblings, uncles and aunts, or first cousins). 
255 For example, in Matter of L-E-A-, the Department argued against the cognizability of the 
respondent’s particular social group because he had not submitted evidence that “this 
paternal relationship between two male individuals is perceived” to be distinct. DHS 2019 
Brief, supra note 105, at 39. It would have been relatively easy to submit evidence that the 
father-son relationship is viewed distinctly in Mexican society. See generally ALFONSO 
SEPÚLVEDA GARCÍA & HABIB DÍAZ NORIEGA, FAMILY LAW IN MEXICO: OVERVIEW (2014) 
(discussing the laws that set out parental rights and obligations in Mexico); Kimberly 
Updegraff et al., Exploring Mothers’ and Fathers’ Relationships with Sons Versus 
Daughters: Links to Adolescent Adjustment in Mexican Immigrant Families, 60 SEX ROLES 
559 (2009) (exploring the differences in how Mexican mothers and fathers treat their sons 
versus daughters). The respondent could also have submitted an expert affidavit on how 
Mexican society views the relationship between a father and son or simply testified to this 
on the record regarding his own experiences. 
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U.S. reflects that this country views the family as significant in some way. 
The Supreme Court has stated, “the Constitution protects the sanctity of the 
family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate 
and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”256 Of 
course, the relevant inquiry is whether the society in question, not the United 
States, views the group distinctly. Nevertheless, the fact that the United States 
has a longstanding history of recognizing the family as the fundamental unit 
of society should give immigration adjudicators some foundation to 
understand how the same might be true in other countries. 
As discussed previously, Attorney General Barr, in L-E-A-, sought 
to establish a new standard for social distinction in cases involving a 
family-based particular social group that would require the applicants to 
demonstrate that their specific families are widely-recognized or well-
known in their societies.257 This position runs counter to the well-
established rule that the proper question is whether nuclear or extended 
families, as a general matter, are socially distinct in the relevant society.258 
However, given the recent decision in L-E-A-, it is quite likely that this 
erroneous line of reasoning may become increasingly common among 
adjudicators. Practitioners may thus want to consider arguing that the 
applicant’s family is in fact well-known or “famous” in some way in the 
society in question, while at the same time pushing back on the position 
that this is a requirement for social distinction.  
For example, the Refugee & Human Rights Clinic regularly submits 
evidence demonstrating that our clients’ families are known as being 
particularly religious, affluent, influential, or some other characteristic and 
are therefore treated differently than others in the community. A recent client 
testified that his was only one of four black families in his town, so they stood 
out and faced widespread derision.259 Another client stated that his family 
was well-known as being one of only a few that were Mormon amidst the 
 
256 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977); see also Obergefell 
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (“Cicero . . . wrote, ‘The first bond of society is 
marriage; next, children; and then the family.’”). The Court has also indicated that one of the 
primary concerns of our immigration laws is to protect family unity. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. 
Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 224 (1996) (“The fundamental purpose of [the 1957 amendment to the 
INA] was to unite families.”). 
257 See supra Section I.D. 
258 See, e.g., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 122, at 33 (instructing asylum 
officers to assess how the relevant society views the degree of relationship). 
259 Declaration of X, represented by the UC Hastings Refugee & Human Rights Clinic, 
granted asylum May 6, 2019. 
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predominantly Catholic community.260 Oftentimes the same evidence that 
supports particularity may also be relevant to social distinction. The client 
referenced in the preceding section was able to argue that the fact that he was 
from a small village where everyone knew his family was evidence of both 
particularity and social distinction. Practitioners should emphasize in these 
cases that the relevant “society” for the social distinction analysis is the 
smaller community or town rather than the country as a whole. Matter of M-
E-V-G- acknowledges that social distinction can be analyzed as “an inquiry 
into a more limited subset of the country’s society.”261 
As with the particularity requirement, adjudicators may be more 
hesitant to find social distinction for particular social groups that include 
extended family members. However, the Department of Homeland Security 
in 2016 acknowledged that, in some societies, “extended family groupings 
may have greater social significance, such that they could meet the 
requirement of social distinction.”262 USCIS stated the same in its 2009 
training materials and instructed that “[a]sylum officers should carefully 
analyze [social distinction] in light of the nature and degree of the family 
group asserted and should pay close attention to country conditions evidence 
about the relevant social attitudes toward family relationships.”263 Though 
the 2009 materials have been superseded, the 2019 USCIS guidance on 
family-based claims still acknowledges the standing requirement that country 
conditions documentation and societal context be considered in each 
individual case, stating that “[o]fficers must analyze each case on its 
merits…each case requires a fact-specific analysis based on the evidence 
presented by the applicant.”264 Regardless of whether the social group is 
limited to nuclear family members or a more extended grouping, practitioners 
should submit clear evidence of social distinction, such as laws and policies 
in the country in question that recognize the family relationship in some 
way,265 secondary sources speaking to the significance of family,266 affidavits 
 
260 Declaration of X, represented by the UC Hastings Refugee & Human Rights Clinic, 
granted asylum Apr. 14, 2017. 
261 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 243 (B.I.A. 2014). 
262 DHS 2016 Brief, supra note 66, at 9. 
263U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, supra note 122, at 33. 
264  USCIS L-E-A- GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 6. 
265 See supra note 254 and accompanying text (noting that the Salvadoran Family Code 
creates obligations for not just parents, but also grandparents, siblings, uncles and aunts, and 
first cousins to provide for minors in their families).  
266 For example, a 1995 country study on Honduras states: 
The family is the fundamental social unit in Honduras . . . People 
emphasize the trust, the assistance, and the solidarity that kin owe to one 
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from experts to this same effect, and testimony from the applicant about how 
families operate as distinct units with the society in question.267  
 
B. Arguing Nexus in Family-Based Targeting Cases 
 
Once the cognizability of a particular social group has been 
established, as well as the fact that the applicant is indeed a member of the 
group, practitioners must next turn to the issue of nexus. Although each case 
must be examined on its individual record, respondents can maximize their 
chances of success by demonstrating how their claims mirror existing case 
law. The following subsections present pointers drawn from the Board’s 
ruling in L-E-A-268 and other cases.  
 
1. Posit a clear theory or theories of why the family was targeted 
 
Applicants should try to explain why the family was targeted rather 
than relying solely on the pattern of harm against family members. Of course, 
as the Fourth Circuit has acknowledged, “[i]t is unrealistic to expect that a 
gang would neatly explain in a note all the legally significant 
reasons it is targeting someone.”269 An asylum applicant is not expected to 
testify as to the exact motivations of her persecutors, but may rely on direct 
 
another. Family loyalty is an ingrained and unquestioned virtue; from early 
childhood, individuals learn that relatives are to be trusted and relied on, 
whereas those outside the family are, implicitly at least, suspect. In all 
areas of life and at every level of society, a person looks to family and kin 
for both social identity and assistance. 
HONDURAS: A COUNTRY STUDY, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION 88-
90 (Tim Merrill, ed., 1995).  
267 For example, an applicant might comment on how everyone refers to children as “[name 
of parent’s] son/daughter” and to women as “[name of husband’s] wife,” demonstrating how 
people are defined by their families. 
268 As previously noted, the Attorney General in L-E-A- left undisturbed the nexus-related 
portion of the Board’s decision. Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- II), 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 597 (Att’y 
Gen. 2018). Focusing instead on cognizability, the Attorney General’s decision includes 
virtually no commentary about nexus. 
269 Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241, 248 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Espinosa-
Cortez v. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 109 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[I]t would be patently absurd to 
expect an applicant . . . to produce . . . documentary evidence of a persecutor’s motives . . . 
since persecutors are hardly likely to submit declarations explaining exactly what motivated 
them to act.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 
371 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that, “because it is difficult to prove 
motive” for persecution, asylum applicants “need only provide some evidence of motive, 
direct or circumstantial” (emphasis added)).  
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or circumstantial evidence.270 However, in practice, where there is no theory 
presented of why the family would have been targeted, it gives adjudicators 
more leeway to instead conclude that the persecutor was motivated by 
“personal reasons” or a generalized criminal intent. 
For example, in Sosa-Perez v. Sessions, the First Circuit upheld the 
Board’s denial of a Honduran woman whose family had suffered repeated 
harm by gangs.271 The petitioner stated that she did not know why the gangs 
targeted her family,272 and both the immigration judge and the Board made 
particular note of this in concluding that she had not experienced harm on 
account of a protected ground but had been the victim of “rampant crime” 
and “pervasive societal violence.”273 The First Circuit noted that although the 
petitioner argued that the pattern of harm against her family was sufficient 
evidence of nexus, the record did not compel that conclusion.274 The court 
distinguished the petitioner’s case from a number of Fourth Circuit decisions 
where the petitioners gave clear explanations of why their families had been 
targeted.275 Similarly, in an unpublished Board decision that followed L-E-A-, 
 
270 See, e.g., Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 131 (3d Cir 2009) (stating that 
“[a]pplicants for asylum bear the burden of providing some evidence of [a motive based on 
a statutorily protected ground], direct or circumstantial” (emphasis added) (internal 
quotations omitted)); Bolanos-Hernandes v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(stating that because refugees are rarely able to offer direct corroboration of specific 
threats, the applicant’s own credible testimony is sufficient); Matter of J-B-N-  S-M-, 24 
I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007) (holding that the burden of proof for the persecutor’s 
motive may be met by testimonial evidence). 
271 Sosa-Perez v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 2018); see also Ruiz-
Escobar v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 252, 259-260 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding no nexus to family 
where the petitioner acknowledged he did not know who his attackers were and had no 
personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding harm to other family members); 
Marin-Portillo v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2016) (finding no nexus where the 
petitioner testified that he did not know why the persecutor wanted to kill him, and rejecting 
the argument that the pattern of targeting the petitioner’s family meant that “the only logical 
inference” was that family membership was the reason for the death threats). 
272 Sosa-Perez v. Sessions, 884 F.3d at 78. 
273 Id. at 80-81. 
274 The court implied that the record could have permitted a different conclusion than 
that reached by the Board, it but noted that it is required to sustain the findings of the 
Board unless the record “compels” a reasonable factfinder to find otherwise. Id. at 80 
(citing Palma-Mazariegos v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2005)). 
275 See Sosa-Perez v. Sessions, 884 F.3d at 82 n.3 (citing Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 
F.3d 241, 248-50 (4th Cir. 2017), in which the petitioner argued she was threatened because 
her father had fled the country after refusing to pay extortion to gang members; 
Cruz v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 122, 129 (4th Cir. 2017), in which the petitioner was targeted by 
organized criminals after she began investigating the disappearance of the father of her 
children; and Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 950 (4th Cir. 2015), in which the 
petitioner was threatened by gang members after refusing to allow her son to join the gang). 
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the Board dismissed the appeal where “[t]he respondent testified to many 
deaths within her extended family, but was unable to provide any reasons or 
even speculate as to the reasons for several of the deaths.”276 The Board 
agreed with the Immigration Judge that the respondent had been targeted 
“based on general criminality or attempts at extortion.”277  
In order to minimize the likelihood that the adjudicator will conclude 
that the applicant was not actually harmed due to the family relationship, 
practitioners should present evidence of the persecutor’s motivation and 
assert a reasonable theory––or theories––as to why the family might have 
been targeted. This can be achieved through careful fact investigation 
involving interviews with the client and other family members where 
appropriate, as well as country conditions documentation and expert 
affidavits on patterns of family-based targeting by specific persecutors in a 
given country. As an illustration, the Refugee & Human Rights Clinic 
represented a young woman who received gang threats, but initially came to us 
not knowing why.278 She told us that her father had been beaten and her mother 
raped by members of the same gang.279 There was a clear pattern of family-
based targeting, but the client had no explanation of why her family had been 
singled out. Clients may not be privy to all of the information that supports 
their family-based claims.280 Interviewing and documenting facts from other 
family members, including obtaining police reports and death certificates, may 
make the difference between a grant or a denial. In this case, after interviewing 
the client’s parents, we learned that they were being extorted, but our client 
was unaware of this fact, because her parents did not want to worry her.281 The 
 
276 Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 19905, 1 (B.I.A. undated but 
post–L-E-A-). 
277 Id. at 2. 
278 Declaration of X, represented by the UC Hastings Refugee & Human Rights Clinic, 
decision pending (on file with author). 
279 Id. 
280 This may be particularly true of children and young persons. In fact, the Asylum Officer 
Basic Training Course Guidelines (AOBTC) recognize the importance of relying on 
objective evidence to determine nexus in cases involving children, since minors often do not 
fully grasp why they have been targeted: 
A child’s inability to understand all of the circumstances surrounding his 
or her flight creates difficulty in analyzing the nexus of the harm or fear of 
harm to a protected ground. Officers must pay close attention to the 
objective facts surrounding the child’s claim to determine if there is a 
nexus regardless of the child’s ability to articulate one. 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, ASYLUM DIVISION, AOBTC GUIDELINES FOR 
CHILDREN’S ASYLUM CLAIMS 53 (2009). 
281 Declarations of X and Y, parents of the client represented by the UC Hastings Refugee & 
Human Rights Clinic, decision pending (on file with author). 
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affidavits that this client’s parents submitted in her case were critical to 
demonstrating that her persecution was tied to her family membership. We also 
submitted country conditions documentation and obtained an affidavit from an 
expert on the client’s home country speaking to the reasons that certain families 
there may be singled out for persecution by gangs.  
 
2. Emphasize that mixed motives are permissible 
 
Claims become more complicated when applicants were also 
persecuted for reasons that may not fall into a protected category, as well as 
on account of their family membership. Despite the clear recognition in the 
law that “mixed motives” are permissible, 282 adjudicators appear to be less 
likely to grant such cases. As noted previously, in L-E-A-, the Board found 
that the respondent was targeted by the gangs because they wanted him to 
sell drugs rather than on account of his family membership.283 Similarly, in 
Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, the Board found that the respondent had not 
been threatened because of his uncle’s cooperation with the investigation of 
the death of his cousin, but so that he would not testify himself.284 
In order to guard against these types of conclusions, practitioners 
should consider affirmatively identifying nonprotected reasons for the 
persecution that occur alongside the family-based targeting and emphasize 
that the presence of these nonprotected reasons does not constitute 
evidence of the absence of a protected reason.285 The First Circuit accepted 
this proposition in Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, stating “we are aware of no 
legal authority supporting the proposition that, if wealth is one reason for 
the alleged persecution of a family member, a protected ground—such as 
family membership—cannot be as well.”286 In the same case, the First 
Circuit acknowledged that motivations can change over time, giving the 
 
282 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
283 Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 46-47 (B.I.A. 2017). 
284 Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 127 (4th Cir. 2011). The Fourth Circuit found 
the Board had applied the incorrect standard in reviewing the Immigration Judge’s finding 
on nexus and remanded, but did not weigh in on the substantive issue of whether the 
petitioner had satisfied nexus. 
285 See, e.g., Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 608 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[I]f there is a nexus between 
the persecution and the membership in a particular social group, the simultaneous existence 
of a personal dispute does not eliminate that nexus.”); Menghesha v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 142, 
148 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n IJ may not treat the presence of a nonpolitical motive as evidence 
of the absence of a political motive.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Grace v. Whitaker, 
344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 131 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Aldana-Ramos and Qu to conclude that the 
simultaneous existence of a personal dispute “does not preclude a positive credible fear 
determination . . . so long as the one central reason for the persecution is a protected ground”). 
286 757 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2014), as amended (Aug. 8, 2014). 
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example of a local militia that initially targets a family because of their 
wealth but then “pursue[s] them throughout the country in order to show 
the local community that even its most prominent families are not immune 
and that the militia’s rule must be respected.”287 There is ample 
documentation that the gangs and cartels that operate in Mexico and 
Central America do not countenance challenges to their authority.288 
Practitioners could explore the theory that a family was initially targeted 
for one reason, but that the motives of the persecutor changed over time 
to a desire to augment their power in the community by making an 
example of the family in question.  
On the other hand, although mixed motives are permissible, it can 
nevertheless be helpful to explicitly rule out other motivations the persecutors 
might have held in order to leave the family-based theory as the most viable 
contender. Again, since a persecutor will rarely state why he is harming 
someone, it can be effective to engage in a “process of elimination” type of 
analysis. For example, in cases where the applicants are children or spouses 
with no access to money, it is harder to argue that they were persecuted for 
their own wealth or as a direct target of extortion. Along these lines, in the 
aforementioned Refugee & Human Rights Clinic case of a young person 
whose parents were being extorted, the client had been threatened by the 
gangs starting from the age of ten.289 The gang members never asked her 
directly for money and it would not have been reasonable to think that she 
would have been able to pay extortion herself since she was just a child.290 
Because of the client’s youth, we were able to rule out pecuniary motives as 
to the persecutors and underscore that she was targeted because of her family 
relationship to her father, as a means to control or punish him, rather than for 
any other reason. Indeed, the gang members only ever threatened to harm the 
client immediately after asking her father for money.291  
 
 
287 Id. at 19. 
288 According to the UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of 
Organized Gang,  
Because respect and reputation play such an important role in gang culture, 
members and entire gangs go to great lengths to establish and defend both. 
Refusals to succumb to a gang’s demands and/or any actions that challenge 
or thwart the gang are perceived as acts of disrespect, and thus often trigger 
a violent and/or punitive response. 
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 155, at ¶ 2. 
289 Declaration of X, represented by the UC Hastings Refugee & Human Rights Clinic, 
decision pending. 
290 Id. 
291 Id. 
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3. Identify temporal patterns in targeting 
 
One piece of evidence that can be critical for family-based 
persecution claims is the timing of targeting of the applicant as well as other 
family members. The Seventh Circuit, in particular, has focused on this issue 
in recent cases. In the August 2018 case W.G.A. v. Sessions, the Seventh 
Circuit found substantial evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion that 
there was no nexus,292 noting that the threats against the petitioner began just 
two days after his brother left the gang, demonstrating that the family 
relationship was what caused him to be targeted.293 In April 2019, the Seventh 
Circuit found nexus in a case where a husband was targeted by a cartel 
member who wanted to “possess” his wife, analogizing it to W.G.A. in that 
“the timing of the persecution and statements made by the persecutors leave 
no doubt that he was and remains a target because of his relationship with his 
wife.”294 The Seventh Circuit is not alone in its interest in looking at temporal 
patterns. In Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, the Fourth Circuit pointed out 
that the petitioner had not been harmed prior to when her father—who was 
the initial target for extortion—fled the country, but that the gangs began 
threatening her immediately after he left.295 Reviewing the converse set of 
facts, the Sixth Circuit, in Bonilla-Morales v. Holder, found no nexus where 
the majority of the harms that the petitioner suffered from gang members 
actually happened prior to their attempts to recruit her son.296  
The timing of harms may be especially relevant as evidence of nexus 
in cases where the persecutor demanded something of the applicant, and the 
applicant complied, but the targeting continued. Illustrating this principle, in an 
unpublished 2019 decision, the Board remanded a case in which the respondent 
acquiesced to paying extortion to gang members, but continued to receive 
threats from them, indicating that the underlying reason for the persecution 
could not have been solely financially-motivated.297 The First Circuit, in 
Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, similarly remanded to consider the petitioners’ 
argument that they could not have been targeted on account of their wealth 
 
292 W.G.A. v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 957, 966 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Oct. 22, 2018). 
293 Id.; see also Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 20037, 6 
(Immigration J. Dec. July 14, 2017) (discussing a case arising in the Seventh Circuit granting 
asylum while noting the fact that the respondent was only harmed by the gang members after 
her son refused their requests to join). 
294 Gonzalez Ruano v. Barr, 922 F.3d 346, 355-56 (7th Cir. 2019). 
295 Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241, 249 (4th Cir. 2017) (“The timing of the 
threats against Zavaleta-Policiano is key, as it indicates that MS–13 was following up on its 
prior threat to target Barrientos’s family if he did not accede to the gang’s demands.”). 
296 Bonilla-Morales v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1132, 1137 (6th Cir. 2010). 
297 P-R-R-, A XXX XXX 272, 2-3 (B.I.A. Feb. 22, 2019) (on file with IRAC). 
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because they had paid their father’s kidnappers, exhausted all of their financial 
resources, and still received threats.298 This logic is not restricted to extortion 
cases. In Cruz v. Sessions, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that the persecutor 
had continued to target the respondent and her children even after she promised 
not to report his criminal activity.299 This pattern of harm evidenced that the 
central underlying reason for the persecution was not the demands––in this case, 
that the respondent stay silent about her husband’s murder––but the familial 
relationship.300 These cases provide a meaningful distinction from L-E-A-, in 
which the respondent refused to give in to the cartel’s request that he sell drugs 
from his father’s store.301 Had he consented and had the threats continued, this 
would clearly have rebutted the Board’s conclusion that the respondent was 
targeted solely to increase the cartel’s profits.302 
 
4. Connect to another protected ground 
 
While adjudicators continue to disagree over whether the “defining 
family member” must also establish nexus to a protected ground, it is 
indisputable that it certainly strengthens an applicant’s claim. The Board 
stated in L-E-A- that nexus is “often” established “in cases where the family 
status is connected to another protected ground, particularly where there is a 
political motive . . . that is intertwined with or underlies the dispute.”303 
Similarly, in Rios v. Lynch, the Ninth Circuit indicated its belief that 
“persecutors are more likely to identify individual family members as part of 
a particular social group when familial ties are ‘linked to race, religion, or 
political affiliation,’” though the court also acknowledged that this is not a 
requirement for nexus.304 In Ayele v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit found that 
the Immigration Judge and Board had erred in not considering whether she 
faced persecution on account of her family membership, given her family’s 
involvement in the opposition political party.305 And in Vumi v. Gonzales, the 
Second Circuit remanded the case of a Congolese petitioner who had been 
persecuted by members of the military, who suspected that her husband had 
 
298 Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2014), as amended (Aug. 8, 2014). 
299 Cruz v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 122, 129 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (Mar. 14, 2017). 
300 Id. 
301 Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 46 (B.I.A. 2017). 
302 Id. at 46-47. 
303Id. at 45 (citing to Ayele v. Holder, 564 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2009); Vumi v. Gonzales, 502 
F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2007); Gebremichael v. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
304 Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing to Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 
F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th Cir. 2005), judgment vacated, 547 U.S. 183 (2006)). 
305 Ayele, 564 F.3d at 869. 
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been involved in the assassination of then-president Kabila.306 The court held 
that the Board had not adequately considered the petitioner’s claims based on 
both her membership in the particular social group of her husband’s family 
members, as well as an imputed anti-Kabila political opinion.307  
In order to maximize an applicant’s likelihood of success, 
practitioners should ascertain if there is any possible way to argue that the 
“defining family member” was targeted on account of protected ground.308 
Under these circumstances, it may also be effective to argue this same 
protected ground as imputed to the applicant,309 in addition to the family-
based particular social group. It seems logical that someone whose family 
member is exceptionally religious or known to be involved in a political party 
may also be assumed by persecutors to fall into the same category. 
 
5. Explain why other members of the family were not harmed 
 
Where the persecutor harmed multiple members of the same family, 
this lends support to the proposition that the persecution was on account of 
the family relationship.310 On the flip side, adjudicators have consistently 
considered the ability of other family members to continue living in their 
country of origin unharmed as evidence that there was no connection between 
the persecution the applicant suffered and family membership.311 The case law 
 
306 Vumi, 502 F.3d at 154. 
307 Id. at 159. 
308 In doing so, it may be useful to apply some of the other tips in this section as to the 
“defining family member” as well, e.g. emphasizing the permissibility of mixed motives, 
ruling out non-protected grounds, and examining the timing of persecution. 
309 See, e.g., Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that the petitioner 
had been persecuted on account of both his membership in his family and the political opinion 
that the gang members had imputed upon him due to his family’s military service); Mema v. 
Gonzalez, 474 F.3d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[A]sylum is available to persons who have been 
persecuted based on imputed political opinion, including situations where a persecutor 
attributes the political opinion of one or more family members to the asylum applicant.”). 
310 See, e.g., Ayele, 564 F.3d at 870 (“Every member of Ayele’s immediate family either is 
in exile, has disappeared, has been imprisoned and tortured, or is under house arrest.”); see 
also U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,  supra note 155, at ¶ 20 (noting that harm to 
other family members may constitute evidence of a well-founded fear of future persecution). 
311 See, e.g., Plaza-Ramirez v. Sessions, 908 F.3d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting the “[t]he 
absence of evidence of threats to or attacks on other family members”); Macias-Padilla v. 
Sessions, 729 F. App’x 541, 543 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Any inference of a nexus between the 
cartel’s actions and the Padilla family relationship is undermined by the fact that other family 
members continue to reside in Mexico, and in the same region, without any known issues 
with the cartel.”); Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 493 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding the 
fact that other family members remained in Honduras and have not faced persecution as 
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clearly states that applicants are not required to show that other members of the 
group––in this context, other family members––were also harmed by the same 
persecutor.312 However, it can significantly strengthen the legal theory to 
affirmatively proffer an explanation of why they have remained safe. 
In order to do so, the key question is what characteristics 
distinguish the applicant from family members who were unharmed. In an 
unpublished Board decision from 2018, Matter of G-F-N-A-, the 
respondent posited that his siblings had not been harmed because they had 
a different last name and thus were not readily identifiable as members of 
the family.313 In a recent Refugee & Human Rights Clinic case, the client 
was substantially older than her siblings. We obtained an affidavit from 
an expert indicating that gang members are more likely to target girls when 
they have become sexually mature enough to be of interest to them.314 
Because the client’s sisters were all under the age of sexual maturity, the 
expert hypothesized that this was why they had not yet been harmed.315 
Another possible explanation for family members that appear to be living 
in safety is that they are in fact not actually safe, but are constantly 
moving, in hiding, or have only been exposed to danger for a limited 
 
evidence against nexus to family-based social group); DHS 2016 Brief, supra note 66, at 18 
(indicating that evidence of whether the persecution was on account of family membership 
should include “of course, any evidence about the circumstances of other family members 
and whether they have been targeted on account of their family relationship”). This position 
appears to be particularly predominant in the Eighth Circuit, which has consistently used the 
fact that other family members were able to remain safely in the country as evidence to deny 
petitions for review of family-based asylum claims. See, e.g., Cambara-Cambara v. Lynch, 
837 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2016) (noting that the fact that the petitioners each left daughters 
in their country of origin undermined their claim); Aguinada-Lopez v. Lynch, 825 F.3d 407, 
409 (8th Cir. 2016) (denying the petition and noting that “extended family” still lived in their 
home country); Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 753-54 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that the 
petitioner’s siblings and children remained in El Salvador and had not been particularly 
targeted). The Eighth Circuit almost seems to require that the entire family as a group have 
been targeted. See, e.g., Antonio-Fuentes v. Holder, 764 F.3d 902, 905 (8th Cir. 2014) 
(“Fuentes . . . did not establish that gangs specifically targeted his family as a group.”).  
312 See, e.g., W.G.A. v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 957, 967 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Oct. 22, 
2018) (nothing that “it was improper for the immigration judge to rely on a lack of harm to 
other family members, without more, to find that [petitioner] was not targeted on account of 
his kinship ties”); Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding that “even 
though the petitioner’s family members in El Salvador remained unharmed… this fact did 
not ‘undermine the reasonableness of [petitioner’s] own fear of persecution’”); Mgoian v 
INS, 184 F.3d 1029, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1999). 
313 G-F-N-A-, A XXX XXX 670 3 (B.I.A. Oct. 19 2018) (on file with IRAC). 
314 Declaration of Héctor Silva Ávalos, Expert on Organized Crime in Guatemala (Dec. 2, 2017). 
315 Id. 
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time.316 For example, the Fourth Circuit, in Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 
noted that even though the petitioner’s children remained in El Salvador, 
the period during which they had been unharmed was only two months 
long.317 
In addition to developing an explanation of why some family 
members were not harmed, practitioners might consider narrowing the 
particular social group formulation to exclude individuals who continue to 
live in the country safely. In an unpublished 2017 decision a few months 
prior to L-E-A-, the Board considered the case of a Salvadoran respondent 
who argued the gangs had targeted him for recruitment as the child of a 
policeman. In denying the appeal, the Board pointed out that the 
respondent’s sister––another member of the particular social group 
defined as nuclear family members of the respondent’s father––had not 
been harmed by the gangs.318 Per controlling authority, this fact should not 
have been dispositive.319 However, given that country conditions 
documentation shows that gangs predominantly recruit young men,320 it 
may have been a more successful strategy to limit the particular social 
group in this case to “male nuclear family members of the respondent’s 
father” rather than formulating it as the entire nuclear family.321  
 
6. If the persecutor harmed other individuals outside of the family, 
explain how the applicant’s persecution is distinguishable 
 
In a way the converse of the preceding Subsection, where the 
persecutor also targeted people that were not members of the family in 
question, practitioners should be prepared to incorporate this into the theory 
of the case. In the aforementioned 2017 Board decision, another of the 
reasons that the Board found no nexus was that the gang members had also 
tried to recruit the respondent’s friends rather than just members of the 
 
316 Practitioners should take particular care not to concede that the applicant could live safely 
and reasonably in another part of the country, for example by pointing out that it would not 
be reasonable to have to constantly move around or remain confined in the house day-and-
night. The internal relocation prong of asylum eligibility is outside the scope of this paper 
but should be carefully documented as well in all asylum cases. 
317 Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 127 n.6 (4th Cir. 2011). 
318 Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 13187, 2 (B.I.A., Feb. 27, 2017). 
319 See supra note 311 (citing to cases that stand for the proposition that applicants are not 
required to show that other members of the group—in this context, other family members—
were also harmed by the same persecutor). 
320 U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 155, at ¶ 11. 
321 This strategy may, however, make it more challenging to satisfy the particularity and 
social distinction tests.  
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particular social group of the respondent’s nuclear family.322 The fact that a 
persecutor harmed others should have no impact on the nexus analysis as to 
the specific applicant, though adjudicators sometimes use this information to 
make inferences about a persecutor’s motivations.323 
Therefore, under these circumstances, practitioners should present 
evidence that the persecutor treated the respondent differently than other victims 
in some way. In this case, the respondent testified that the gang members 
mentioned his father by name when they approached him and had an expert 
witness testify that the gangs disproportionately targeted family members of 
policemen for recruitment.324 These facts support the argument that even if the 
gang members persecuted other young men in the community, one central 
reason for the respondent’s persecution was his family membership. Perhaps 
additional facts could have been presented to further differentiate how the 
respondent was treated versus his friends, who were also approached for 
recruitment. If the respondent had been harmed more severely––such as 
receiving more serious threats or more frequent attempts at recruitment––this 
could have further supported the family-based nexus argument. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Last year, I was part of a group of students and attorneys that traveled 
to the border to volunteer with migrants waiting to enter the United States. It 
was eminently clear that Trump’s characterization of asylum seekers as 
“stone cold criminals”325 and their applications for asylum as a “big fat con 
job”326 could not be further from the truth. Person after person recounted truly 
horrific stories, including children threatened with kidnapping, siblings 
murdered, and entire families that uprooted their lives to escape abuses that are 
 
322 Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 13187, 2 (B.I.A., Feb. 27, 2017). 
323 The applicant is only required to show that “one central reason” for the persecution was 
a protected ground. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Persecutors may have similar 
or different reasons for harming other victims, but this is immaterial to the nexus analysis as 
to the individual applicant. 
324 Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 13187, at 2. 
325 Allen Smith, Trump Demands Mexico Send Migrants Back to Countries of Origin After 
Border Patrol Fires Tear Gas, NBC NEWS (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
politics/immigration/trump-asks-mexico-send-migrants-back-countries-origin-after-border-
n939966 [https://perma.cc/C6CN-VHLX].  
326 Maria Sacchetti, U.S. Asylum Process is at the Center of Trump’s Immigration Ire, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/us-asylum-process-is-
at-the-center-of-trumps-immigration-ire/2019/04/09/7f8259b8-5aec-11e9-842d-7d3ed7eb3 
957_story.html?utm_term=.9fed1fe8c0db [https://perma.cc/3TGU-PT9L].  
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unimaginable in our country. These were not individuals who made the decision 
lightly to abandon their homes and undertake the dangerous journey north.327  
Attorney General Barr’s decision in Matter of L-E-A- gives 
adjudicators who favor denials another excuse to rebuff asylum applicants 
and return them to countries where they face serious harm, including death.328 
However, the central thesis of this Article is that family-based particular 
social group membership is buttressed by decades of legal precedent that 
cannot be erased with a stroke of the Attorney General’s pen. People are 
being beaten, kidnapped, hunted down, tortured, and killed––not because of 
anything that they have done, but because of who their family members are. 
Our laws should––and do––protect these individuals.  
 
 
327 See, e.g., PBS News Hour, Migrants Risk the Dangerous Trip to the U.S. Because It’s Safer 
Than Staying Home, PBS (June 20, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/ migrants-risk-
the-dangerous-trip-to-the-u-s-because-its-safer-than-staying-home [https://perma.cc/NGY8-9B 
YN] (interviewing asylum seekers who were escaping horrific situations in their home countries).  
328 See, e.g., Maria Sacchetti, ‘Death is Waiting for Him,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/local/asylum-deported-ms-13-honduras/? 
utm_term=.57fa3520b4bc [https://perma.cc/7FRW-4NTD] (reporting on a case in which a 
man was denied asylum, and was murdered soon after he was deported). 
